ai manifest registry indexing and discovery
Maintains a centralized, publicly queryable index of AI service manifests published at provider domains via `.well-known/ai.json` endpoints. Implements a pull-based aggregation model where WellKnownAI periodically fetches and validates manifests from registered provider domains, then serves a unified `registry.json` file mapping domain names to their manifest metadata. Supports decentralized provider self-hosting while enabling downstream systems (MCP clients, agent frameworks) to discover capabilities without direct provider queries.
Unique: Uses a decentralized pull model where providers self-host manifests at their own domains (`.well-known/ai.json`) while WellKnownAI indexes them, eliminating the need for a centralized manifest submission API and enabling providers to maintain canonical specs without intermediary control. Contrasts with centralized registries (npm, PyPI) that require uploading packages to a central server.
vs alternatives: Enables decentralized capability discovery without PII exposure or centralized vendor lock-in, whereas traditional API registries (Swagger Hub, RapidAPI) require uploading specs to third-party servers and often include user data.
ai manifest schema validation with structured error reporting
Provides CLI-based validation tooling (`validate-ai.mjs`) that checks manifest JSON documents against the AI Manifest v0.1 JSON schema, reporting structural conformance errors and warnings. Validates required fields (manifest_version, provider, spec, capabilities), nested object structures (servers, auth, receipts), and field types (strings, arrays, URNs). Outputs validation results as JSON reports suitable for CI/CD integration, enabling providers to catch schema violations before publishing.
Unique: Implements validation as a standalone CLI tool that can be run locally or in CI/CD pipelines without requiring network calls to WellKnownAI, enabling offline validation and reducing dependency on external services. Outputs structured JSON reports for programmatic error handling, rather than human-readable text.
vs alternatives: Provides schema validation specific to AI Manifest v0.1 without requiring submission to a central service, whereas OpenAPI validators (swagger-cli, spectacle) are generic and don't understand agent-specific fields like capabilities or auth.jwks_uri.
bearer token authentication scheme declaration and validation
Enables providers to declare bearer token authentication requirements in manifests via the `auth.schemes[]` array, specifying that clients must provide a bearer token (e.g., API key, JWT) to access the service. Manifests include `auth.jwks_uri` pointing to the provider's JWKS endpoint for token signature verification. Validation tooling checks that auth schemes are properly formatted and JWKS URIs are valid URLs. Enables downstream systems to understand authentication requirements and implement token validation without hardcoding provider-specific auth logic.
Unique: Implements authentication declaration as manifest metadata pointing to provider's JWKS endpoint, enabling clients to verify tokens cryptographically without calling the provider's authentication service. Supports decentralized token verification without requiring a centralized auth server.
vs alternatives: Provides simpler authentication than OAuth 2.0 (no authorization server required) or mTLS (no certificate infrastructure), while enabling cryptographic token verification without service calls.
manifest signature generation and receipt validation
Enables providers to cryptographically sign their manifests using private keys and include signatures in the `receipts.signature[]` array, allowing downstream systems to verify manifest authenticity and detect tampering. Signatures are computed over the manifest JSON using RSA algorithms, with signature metadata (algorithm, key ID, timestamp) included in the receipt. Validation tooling checks signature structure and format but does not verify signature validity (requires downstream systems to perform cryptographic verification using provider's JWKS). Enables end-to-end manifest integrity verification without requiring a centralized signing authority.
Unique: Implements manifest signing as optional metadata (signatures in receipts array) rather than a required field, enabling providers to adopt signing incrementally without breaking existing manifests. Supports multiple signatures for key rotation scenarios where old and new keys are both valid.
vs alternatives: Provides simpler manifest signing than full PKI (no certificate authority required) while enabling cryptographic verification, at the cost of requiring providers to manage key rotation manually.
provider contact information declaration and validation
Enables providers to declare contact information in manifests via the `contact.*` fields (email, phone, support URL, etc.), allowing downstream systems and users to reach out with questions, issues, or integration requests. Validation tooling checks that contact fields are properly formatted (valid email addresses, valid URLs). Provides a standardized way for providers to publish contact information alongside their manifest, reducing friction for service discovery and integration.
Unique: Implements contact information as optional manifest metadata with format validation, enabling providers to publish contact details alongside capabilities without requiring a separate contact registry. Validation is format-only, reducing validation overhead.
vs alternatives: Provides simpler contact information management than separate contact registries or CRM systems, by embedding contact details in the manifest itself.
server endpoint declaration with type and url metadata
Enables providers to declare service endpoints in manifests via the `servers[]` array, specifying endpoint URLs, types (REST, WebSocket, gRPC, etc.), and metadata. Each server entry includes URL, type, and optional description, allowing downstream systems to discover available endpoints and their protocols without requiring external documentation. Validation tooling checks that server URLs are valid and types are recognized. Supports multiple endpoints per service (e.g., REST API, WebSocket for streaming, gRPC for performance).
Unique: Implements endpoint declaration as structured metadata (URL + type) rather than free-form strings, enabling protocol-aware service discovery. Supports multiple endpoints per service without requiring separate manifests.
vs alternatives: Provides simpler endpoint discovery than OpenAPI (which requires full schema parsing) while supporting non-REST protocols (WebSocket, gRPC) that OpenAPI does not natively support.
jwks (json web key set) validation for manifest signature verification
Provides CLI validation tool (`validate-jwks.mjs`) that validates RSA public key sets published at `/.well-known/jwks.json` endpoints, ensuring they conform to JWKS specification and contain properly formatted RSA keys. Validates key structure (kty, use, kid, n, e fields), key format (base64url encoding), and key metadata. Enables downstream systems to verify manifest signatures using provider's public keys, establishing a trust chain for manifest authenticity without requiring a central CA.
Unique: Implements JWKS validation as a standalone CLI tool that providers can run before publishing keys, enabling early detection of key format errors. Supports the AgentPKI pattern of decentralized key management where each provider publishes their own JWKS rather than relying on a central certificate authority.
vs alternatives: Provides JWKS-specific validation without requiring integration with a PKI provider (e.g., Let's Encrypt), enabling lightweight key rotation for agent manifests without the overhead of traditional certificate management.
crl (certificate revocation list) validation for compliance and key rotation
Provides CLI validation tool (`validate-crl.mjs`) that validates Certificate Revocation List documents published at `/.well-known/ai-crl.json` endpoints. CRL documents contain revocation entries (kid, revocation_reason, revoked_at) that signal when signing keys have been compromised or rotated out. Validates CRL structure, timestamp formats, and revocation entry completeness. Enables downstream systems to check whether a manifest's signing key has been revoked before trusting the signature.
Unique: Implements CRL as a lightweight JSON document (rather than X.509 CRL binary format) that providers can publish alongside manifests, enabling simple revocation signaling without PKI infrastructure. Supports agent-specific revocation reasons (e.g., 'key_compromise', 'superseded') rather than generic certificate revocation codes.
vs alternatives: Provides simpler revocation signaling than X.509 CRL or OCSP, suitable for lightweight agent manifest signing where full PKI overhead is not justified.
+6 more capabilities