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| Match Graph | 0 | 0 |
| Pricing | Free | Free |
| Capabilities | 12 decomposed | 8 decomposed |
| Times Matched | 0 | 0 |
Analyzes incoming prompts and user inputs in real-time to detect prompt injection attacks before they reach the LLM, using a neural model trained on the world's largest prompt injection dataset. The API processes requests synchronously with claimed sub-50ms latency, enabling inline deployment in production LLM pipelines without noticeable user-facing delay. Detection operates model-agnostically across any LLM backend (OpenAI, Anthropic, open-source, etc.) by analyzing prompt structure and semantic intent rather than model-specific artifacts.
Unique: Trained on the world's largest prompt injection dataset (claimed) with model-agnostic detection that doesn't require knowledge of the downstream LLM architecture, enabling deployment across heterogeneous LLM stacks. Uses neural detection rather than rule-based pattern matching, allowing adaptation to novel injection techniques.
vs alternatives: Faster than rule-based injection filters (regex, keyword matching) and more portable than model-specific defenses because it detects injection intent semantically rather than relying on LLM-specific safety mechanisms that vary by provider.
Identifies and blocks jailbreak prompts—carefully crafted inputs designed to circumvent an LLM's safety guidelines—by analyzing prompt semantics, role-play framing, and instruction-override patterns. The detection model recognizes common jailbreak techniques (e.g., 'pretend you are an unrestricted AI', 'ignore your guidelines', hypothetical scenarios designed to elicit unsafe content) and flags them before the prompt reaches the LLM, preventing the LLM from being manipulated into generating harmful content.
Unique: Detects jailbreak attempts semantically by analyzing prompt intent and framing patterns rather than keyword matching, enabling detection of novel jailbreak techniques that rephrase known attacks. Operates independently of the downstream LLM's safety mechanisms, providing a defense layer that works across any model.
vs alternatives: More effective than LLM-native safety features (which can be circumvented) because it blocks jailbreaks before they reach the model, and more adaptive than static keyword filters because it recognizes semantic intent and novel phrasings.
Enables centralized threat policy management across multiple LLM applications and deployments, allowing security teams to define threat policies once and apply them consistently across all applications without per-application configuration. Policies can be updated globally without redeploying applications, enabling rapid response to emerging threats or policy changes. This provides a control plane for LLM security across an organization's entire LLM portfolio.
Unique: Provides centralized policy control plane for threat detection across multiple LLM applications, enabling organization-wide security policies without per-application configuration. Policies can be updated globally without redeploying applications.
vs alternatives: More scalable than per-application threat detection configuration and faster to update than redeploying applications, though actual policy management capabilities and update latency are undocumented.
Provides bidirectional threat detection that scans both user inputs (before they reach the LLM) and LLM outputs (before they're returned to users). This dual-direction approach prevents both adversarial inputs (prompt injection, jailbreaks) and harmful outputs (toxic content, PII leakage from the LLM's training data). The API can be called at two points in the request/response pipeline: before LLM inference (to protect the LLM) and after LLM inference (to protect users).
Unique: Provides bidirectional threat detection at both input and output stages of the LLM pipeline, enabling comprehensive protection against both adversarial attacks and model-generated harms. Single API can be used for both directions.
vs alternatives: More comprehensive than input-only detection (which misses harmful outputs) and more practical than output-only detection (which can't prevent adversarial attacks), though requires two API calls per request.
Analyzes user inputs and LLM outputs for toxic, abusive, hateful, or otherwise harmful language across 100+ languages. The detection model identifies profanity, slurs, harassment, threats, and other content that violates community standards or platform policies. Operates in real-time with sub-50ms latency, allowing toxic content to be flagged, filtered, or logged before it reaches users or is stored in application logs.
Unique: Supports detection across 100+ languages with a single API call, using a multilingual neural model rather than language-specific classifiers. Operates on both user inputs and LLM outputs, providing bidirectional content filtering.
vs alternatives: Broader language coverage than most open-source toxicity classifiers (which typically support 5-20 languages) and faster than human moderation queues, though less contextually nuanced than trained human moderators.
Detects and flags the presence of sensitive personally identifiable information (PII) in user inputs and LLM outputs, including email addresses, phone numbers, credit card numbers, social security numbers, names, addresses, and other regulated data. The detection model uses pattern matching and semantic analysis to identify PII across multiple formats and languages, enabling applications to prevent accidental exposure of sensitive data in logs, outputs, or external integrations.
Unique: Operates bidirectionally on both user inputs and LLM outputs, detecting PII leakage in both directions. Uses pattern matching combined with semantic analysis to identify PII across multiple formats and languages without requiring explicit data masking rules.
vs alternatives: More comprehensive than regex-based PII detection (which misses context-dependent cases) and faster than manual compliance audits, though less accurate than human review for ambiguous cases.
Provides unified threat detection (prompt injection, jailbreaks, toxic content, PII) that works identically across any LLM backend—OpenAI, Anthropic, open-source models, custom fine-tuned models, or multi-model ensembles. The detection operates at the input/output level rather than relying on model-specific safety mechanisms, enabling consistent security posture regardless of which LLM provider or version is used. This allows teams to switch LLM providers or use multiple models in parallel without reconfiguring security policies.
Unique: Detects threats at the semantic/intent level rather than relying on model-specific artifacts, enabling a single detection pipeline to work across OpenAI, Anthropic, open-source, and custom LLMs without modification. Provides abstraction layer that decouples security policy from LLM provider choice.
vs alternatives: More portable than model-specific safety mechanisms (which require reconfiguration per provider) and more flexible than LLM-native guardrails (which vary by model), enabling true provider independence.
Provides threat detection via a synchronous REST API that integrates directly into request/response pipelines, enabling inline security checks without asynchronous processing or external queues. The API accepts a prompt or text input and returns threat detection results (injection, jailbreak, toxic, PII flags) within sub-50ms, allowing the application to make immediate allow/block decisions before passing data to the LLM or returning it to users. Integration is straightforward: call the API before LLM inference or after LLM output generation, and handle the response synchronously.
Unique: Designed for inline integration into synchronous request/response pipelines with sub-50ms latency, enabling threat detection without asynchronous processing, queuing, or external state management. API-first architecture allows integration into any application stack without SDKs or language-specific bindings.
vs alternatives: Simpler integration than async threat detection systems (no queues, callbacks, or state management) and faster than batch processing, though less efficient for high-throughput scenarios where batching would reduce overhead.
+4 more capabilities
Evaluates LLM outputs against curated question sets spanning three distinct hazard domains (biosecurity, cybersecurity, chemical security) using domain-expert-validated benchmarks. The assessment framework maps model responses to risk levels within each domain, enabling quantitative measurement of dangerous capability presence. Responses are scored against rubrics developed by security domain experts to identify whether models can produce actionable harmful information.
Unique: Combines expert-validated questions across three distinct security domains (biosecurity, cybersecurity, chemical) into a unified benchmark framework, rather than treating each domain separately. Uses domain-expert rubrics for scoring rather than automated classifiers, ensuring nuanced assessment of harmful capability presence.
vs alternatives: More comprehensive than single-domain safety benchmarks (e.g., ToxiGen for toxicity) because it measures dangerous knowledge across multiple hazard categories simultaneously, enabling holistic safety evaluation.
Provides standardized evaluation infrastructure to measure the effectiveness of unlearning techniques (methods that remove dangerous capabilities from trained models) by comparing model performance before and after unlearning interventions. The framework isolates the impact of unlearning by holding the benchmark constant while varying the model state, enabling quantitative assessment of whether dangerous knowledge has been successfully suppressed.
Unique: Provides a standardized evaluation harness specifically designed for unlearning research, with built-in comparison logic and side-effect detection. Unlike generic benchmarks, it explicitly measures delta between model states and flags unintended capability loss.
vs alternatives: More rigorous than ad-hoc unlearning evaluation because it enforces consistent benchmark administration, statistical testing, and side-effect measurement across all methods being compared.
WMDP scores higher at 63/100 vs Lakera Guard at 57/100. Lakera Guard leads on quality, while WMDP is stronger on ecosystem.
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Implements a structured scoring framework where model responses to dangerous knowledge questions are evaluated against expert-developed rubrics that assess the degree of hazard (e.g., specificity, actionability, completeness of harmful information). Responses are scored on multi-point scales (typically 0-4 or 0-5) rather than binary pass/fail, capturing nuance in how dangerous a model's output actually is. Rubrics are domain-specific (biosecurity, cybersecurity, chemical) and developed by subject matter experts to ensure validity.
Unique: Uses domain-expert-developed multi-point rubrics rather than automated classifiers or binary labels, enabling nuanced assessment of dangerous knowledge severity. Rubrics are calibrated to distinguish between vague, incomplete, and highly actionable harmful information.
vs alternatives: More interpretable and defensible than black-box classifiers because rubric criteria are explicit and expert-validated; enables stakeholders to understand why a response received a particular score.
Analyzes patterns in how dangerous knowledge correlates across the three benchmark domains (biosecurity, cybersecurity, chemical security), identifying whether models that excel at suppressing one type of hazard tend to suppress others. The analysis uses statistical correlation and clustering techniques to reveal whether dangerous capabilities are independent or coupled in model behavior. This enables understanding of whether unlearning interventions have domain-specific or global effects.
Unique: Explicitly analyzes relationships between dangerous knowledge across domains rather than treating each domain independently. Enables discovery of whether hazards are coupled or independent in model behavior.
vs alternatives: Provides deeper insight than single-domain benchmarks by revealing how safety properties interact across different hazard categories, informing more effective unlearning strategies.
Manages the creation, validation, and versioning of benchmark questions and rubrics through a structured curation pipeline involving domain experts, adversarial testing, and iterative refinement. The pipeline ensures questions are sufficiently difficult to elicit dangerous knowledge without being unrealistic, and rubrics are calibrated through inter-rater agreement studies. Version control enables tracking of benchmark evolution and ensures reproducibility across research papers.
Unique: Implements a formal curation pipeline with expert validation and inter-rater agreement checks, rather than ad-hoc question collection. Versioning enables reproducible research and transparent tracking of benchmark evolution.
vs alternatives: More rigorous than informal benchmarks because it enforces expert review, inter-rater validation, and version control, reducing bias and enabling reproducible comparisons across papers.
Provides a unified interface for evaluating diverse LLM architectures (open-source models, API-based models, fine-tuned variants) by abstracting away implementation differences. The abstraction handles API calls (OpenAI, Anthropic, etc.), local inference (Hugging Face, Ollama), and custom model serving, enabling consistent benchmark administration across heterogeneous model types. This enables fair comparison between models with different deployment modalities.
Unique: Abstracts away differences between API-based, local, and custom-deployed models through a unified interface, enabling fair comparison without reimplementing benchmark logic for each model type.
vs alternatives: More flexible than model-specific benchmarks because it supports any LLM architecture without code changes, reducing friction for researchers evaluating new models.
Implements rigorous statistical testing to determine whether differences in dangerous knowledge scores between models or unlearning methods are statistically significant or due to random variation. Uses techniques like bootstrap confidence intervals, permutation tests, and effect size estimation to quantify uncertainty in benchmark results. This prevents overconfident claims about safety improvements that may not be robust.
Unique: Integrates formal statistical testing into the benchmark evaluation pipeline rather than relying on point estimates, ensuring claims about safety improvements are statistically justified.
vs alternatives: More rigorous than informal comparisons because it quantifies uncertainty and prevents overconfident claims about safety improvements that may not be robust to sampling variation.
Employs adversarial testing techniques to validate that benchmark questions reliably elicit dangerous knowledge and cannot be easily circumvented by prompt engineering. Red-teamers attempt to find questions that fail to elicit dangerous knowledge or rubric edge cases, and the benchmark is iteratively refined based on findings. This ensures the benchmark is robust to adversarial adaptation and captures genuine dangerous capabilities rather than surface-level patterns.
Unique: Incorporates formal red-teaming into the benchmark validation pipeline rather than assuming questions are robust, ensuring the benchmark remains effective against adversarial adaptation.
vs alternatives: More robust than static benchmarks because it actively searches for evasion techniques and iteratively refines questions, reducing the risk that models can circumvent the benchmark through prompt engineering.