agentic-workflow-security-scanning
Scans agentic workflows (agent definitions, tool integrations, LLM chains) for security vulnerabilities by parsing workflow configurations and analyzing tool-use patterns. Uses static analysis to detect unsafe function calls, unvalidated tool inputs, privilege escalation risks, and insecure API integrations without requiring runtime execution. Operates as a CLI that ingests workflow definitions (YAML, JSON, or Python agent code) and outputs a structured vulnerability report with severity levels and remediation guidance.
Unique: Purpose-built for agentic workflows specifically — analyzes tool-use patterns, function-calling schemas, and agent-to-API integration risks rather than generic code security. Understands agent-specific threat models like prompt injection through tool outputs, unauthorized tool chaining, and capability escalation through multi-step agent reasoning.
vs alternatives: Specialized for LLM agent security scanning vs general-purpose SAST tools (Semgrep, Snyk) which lack agentic-specific vulnerability patterns and tool-use risk modeling
tool-schema-validation-and-analysis
Parses and validates tool schemas (OpenAPI, JSON Schema, function signatures) declared in agent configurations to detect unsafe parameter types, missing input validation, and overly permissive function signatures. Analyzes tool definitions against security patterns (e.g., detects if a tool accepts arbitrary shell commands, file paths without sanitization, or database queries without parameterization). Builds a tool dependency graph to identify chains of tools that could be exploited sequentially.
Unique: Builds tool dependency graphs specific to agentic workflows to detect multi-step exploitation chains — understands that a safe tool becomes dangerous when called after another tool that produces attacker-controlled output. Includes agentic-specific risk patterns like 'tool output injection' and 'capability escalation through tool chaining'.
vs alternatives: More sophisticated than generic schema validators (Ajv, JSON Schema validators) because it understands agent-specific threat models and tool interaction patterns rather than just structural validation
prompt-injection-vulnerability-detection
Scans agent prompts and system messages for patterns that could enable prompt injection attacks, such as unvalidated user input being concatenated directly into prompts, missing delimiters between user and system content, or insufficient guardrails against instruction override. Uses pattern matching and semantic analysis to detect where user-controlled data flows into LLM inputs without sanitization. Identifies risky prompt construction patterns like f-strings with untrusted variables or template injection vulnerabilities.
Unique: Specifically targets agentic prompt injection patterns — understands that agents are vulnerable not just through direct user input but through tool outputs that get fed back into prompts. Detects injection vectors specific to multi-turn agent reasoning where earlier tool outputs can influence later prompt execution.
vs alternatives: More specialized than generic code injection detectors because it understands LLM-specific injection patterns and the unique threat model of agentic systems where tool outputs become prompt inputs
agent-capability-risk-assessment
Analyzes the declared capabilities of an agent (tools, APIs, permissions, resource access) to assess the overall risk profile and potential for misuse. Evaluates what an agent could theoretically do if compromised or manipulated, including access to sensitive data stores, ability to modify systems, network access, and credential usage. Produces a capability matrix showing which resources the agent can access and flags high-risk capability combinations (e.g., database write access + email sending = potential data exfiltration).
Unique: Understands agentic-specific risk models where the threat is not just individual tool misuse but the combination of tools and the agent's reasoning capability to chain them together. Detects capability combinations that are individually safe but dangerous when combined (e.g., read database + write file + network access = data exfiltration).
vs alternatives: More sophisticated than static permission checkers because it models agent-specific threat scenarios (reasoning-based capability chaining) rather than just checking individual permission grants
ci-cd-pipeline-integration-and-gating
Integrates with CI/CD systems (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins) to automatically scan agent code on commits and pull requests, blocking merges if security vulnerabilities exceed configured thresholds. Provides exit codes and structured output (JSON, SARIF) for CI/CD consumption. Supports policy-as-code to define organization-specific security rules (e.g., 'no agent can access production databases', 'all tools must have input validation'). Generates reports and metrics for security dashboards.
Unique: Purpose-built for agentic workflows in CI/CD — understands that agent security scanning needs to happen at code review time before deployment, not just at runtime. Integrates with version control workflows to provide feedback on agent changes before merge.
vs alternatives: More integrated than running generic security scanners in CI/CD because it understands agentic-specific policies and can enforce agent-specific security gates (e.g., 'no agent can have write access to production database')
multi-agent-system-security-analysis
Analyzes security implications of multi-agent systems where multiple agents interact, delegate tasks, or share resources. Detects inter-agent communication vulnerabilities, privilege escalation through agent-to-agent delegation, resource contention issues, and unauthorized information flow between agents. Models agent interaction patterns to identify scenarios where one agent could be compromised to attack another or where agents could collude to bypass security controls.
Unique: Specifically models multi-agent threat scenarios where the attack vector is agent-to-agent rather than external. Understands agent delegation patterns and can detect privilege escalation through task delegation chains, which is unique to agentic systems.
vs alternatives: Addresses a threat model that generic security tools don't cover — agent-to-agent attacks and privilege escalation through delegation, which is specific to multi-agent systems