What can @treeship/mcp do?

mcp tool call attestation and verification, mcp tool registry wrapping with attestation injection, cryptographic proof generation for tool invocations, tool invocation metadata capture and serialization, attestation proof validation and verification, agent identity and caller context tracking

@treeship/mcp

MCP ServerFree

Drop-in Treeship attestation for MCP tool calls

Open Source

/ 100

6 capabilities

Capabilities6 decomposed

mcp tool call attestation and verification

Medium confidence

Intercepts and cryptographically attests MCP (Model Context Protocol) tool invocations by wrapping the tool-calling interface, capturing execution metadata (tool name, arguments, timestamp, caller identity), and generating verifiable attestation proofs that can be validated downstream. Uses a middleware pattern to inject attestation logic into the MCP tool registry without modifying underlying tool implementations.

Solves for

I need to prove that an AI agent actually called a specific tool with specific arguments at a specific timeI want to create an auditable trail of tool invocations for compliance or debugging purposesI need to prevent tool call spoofing or tampering in multi-agent or untrusted environmentsI want to attach cryptographic proof to tool calls so downstream systems can verify their authenticity

Best for

teams building AI agents with compliance requirements (finance, healthcare, legal)

developers implementing multi-agent systems with untrusted participants

builders needing audit trails for tool execution in production LLM applications

Requires

Node.js 16+ (typical for npm packages)

MCP-compatible framework or runtime (Claude SDK, LangChain MCP integration, or custom MCP server)

Cryptographic library support (Node.js crypto module or compatible alternative)

Limitations

Attestation adds latency to each tool call (exact overhead unknown from package metadata)

Requires MCP-compatible tool registry — cannot attest non-MCP tool calls

No built-in persistence layer — attestation proofs must be stored externally

What makes it unique

Provides drop-in attestation specifically for MCP tool calls via middleware wrapping, enabling cryptographic proof of tool invocation without requiring changes to tool implementations or MCP server code — focuses on the MCP protocol layer rather than generic function call logging

vs alternatives

Lighter-weight than building custom audit logging on top of MCP servers because it integrates at the protocol level; more specialized than generic observability tools because it provides cryptographic attestation rather than just metrics/tracing

mcp tool registry wrapping with attestation injection

Medium confidence

Wraps the MCP tool registry (the central registry where tools are registered and discovered) to transparently inject attestation logic into tool definitions and execution paths. When a tool is registered or invoked through the wrapped registry, the wrapper automatically captures metadata, generates attestation proofs, and returns wrapped results with attestation attached, without requiring modifications to tool implementations or caller code.

Solves for

I want to add attestation to all tools in my MCP server without modifying each tool individuallyI need a transparent way to intercept tool calls at the registry level for auditingI want to ensure every tool invocation is attested before it executes or after it completes

Best for

MCP server operators deploying multiple tools and needing uniform attestation

developers building MCP-based agent frameworks with built-in compliance

teams standardizing on attestation across heterogeneous tool ecosystems

Requires

MCP-compatible tool registry interface

Access to tool registry initialization code

Node.js environment with ES6 Proxy or equivalent metaprogramming support

Limitations

Registry wrapping may introduce performance overhead proportional to tool count

Incompatible with tools that bypass the registry or use direct function references

Attestation metadata captured at registry level may not include tool-internal state or side effects

What makes it unique

Operates at the MCP registry abstraction level rather than individual tool level, allowing single-point injection of attestation across all tools via a wrapper pattern — enables uniform attestation policy without tool-by-tool configuration

vs alternatives

More maintainable than per-tool attestation wrappers because changes to attestation logic apply globally; more transparent than manual logging because it's injected at the registry boundary rather than scattered through tool code

cryptographic proof generation for tool invocations

Medium confidence

Generates cryptographic proofs (signatures, tokens, or hashes) that bind tool invocation metadata (tool name, arguments, timestamp, caller identity, execution result) into a verifiable artifact. The proof generation likely uses HMAC, digital signatures, or similar schemes to create tamper-evident records that can be validated by external systems without access to the original tool execution context.

Solves for

I need to create a tamper-proof record that proves a tool was called with specific argumentsI want to generate a signature that can be verified by a third party without re-executing the toolI need to bind tool call metadata into a single verifiable artifact for audit purposes

Best for

compliance-heavy environments requiring non-repudiation of tool calls

multi-party systems where tool calls must be verified by untrusted parties

audit scenarios requiring cryptographic proof of execution

Requires

Node.js crypto module or compatible cryptographic library

Shared secret or key pair for proof generation and verification

Deterministic serialization of tool metadata (JSON or similar)

Limitations

Proof generation adds computational overhead (signature/HMAC cost per call)

Proof format and algorithm not documented in public package metadata

No key rotation or management strategy specified

What makes it unique

Generates cryptographic proofs specifically bound to MCP tool invocation context (tool name, args, caller, timestamp) rather than generic function call signatures — enables verification of tool calls as discrete events rather than just code execution

vs alternatives

More robust than simple logging because proofs are tamper-evident; more lightweight than full blockchain solutions because it uses standard cryptography rather than distributed consensus

tool invocation metadata capture and serialization

Medium confidence

Automatically captures structured metadata about each tool invocation (tool name, arguments, caller identity, timestamp, execution duration, result status) and serializes it into a canonical format suitable for attestation and audit logging. Uses introspection of the MCP tool call context to extract metadata without requiring explicit instrumentation of tool code.

Solves for

I want to automatically capture all relevant context about a tool call without modifying the toolI need structured metadata about tool invocations for audit logging and compliance reportingI want to serialize tool call context in a canonical format for downstream processing

Best for

audit and compliance teams needing structured tool call records

developers building observability/monitoring on top of MCP

organizations standardizing on tool call metadata formats

Requires

MCP tool invocation context with accessible metadata fields

Timestamp source (system clock or provided)

Caller identity context (from MCP request or agent framework)

Limitations

Metadata capture may miss tool-internal state or side effects not visible at MCP boundary

Serialization format not documented — may not be compatible with external audit systems

Caller identity capture depends on MCP context availability — may be incomplete in some scenarios

What makes it unique

Captures metadata at the MCP protocol boundary, extracting tool name, arguments, caller, and timing information automatically without requiring tool-level instrumentation — enables uniform metadata collection across heterogeneous tools

vs alternatives

More complete than manual logging because it captures all MCP context automatically; more standardized than ad-hoc logging because metadata is serialized in a canonical format

attestation proof validation and verification

Medium confidence

Provides mechanisms to validate and verify cryptographic attestation proofs generated by tool invocations, checking that proofs are well-formed, signatures are valid, and metadata has not been tampered with. Verification logic likely uses the same cryptographic keys/algorithms used for proof generation to reconstruct and validate the proof against captured metadata.

Solves for

I need to verify that a tool call attestation proof is valid and has not been tampered withI want to validate that a tool invocation actually occurred with the claimed metadataI need to check attestation proofs in a downstream system without access to the original tool execution

Best for

audit systems validating tool call proofs

compliance checkers verifying attestation chains

downstream systems receiving tool call attestations and needing to verify them

Requires

Cryptographic key (shared secret or public key) matching the proof generation key

Attestation proof object or serialized proof string

Original tool metadata for comparison (or reconstructed from proof)

Limitations

Verification requires access to the same cryptographic key used for proof generation

No built-in key distribution or management — keys must be managed externally

Verification logic may not be exposed as a public API (unknown from package metadata)

What makes it unique

Provides verification specifically for MCP tool call attestations, validating that proofs correspond to actual tool invocations with claimed metadata — enables third-party validation of tool calls without re-execution

vs alternatives

More focused than generic cryptographic verification libraries because it understands MCP tool call context; more practical than blockchain-based verification because it uses standard cryptography without distributed consensus overhead

agent identity and caller context tracking

Medium confidence

Captures and tracks the identity of the agent, user, or system that initiated a tool call, associating this caller context with each attestation. Integrates with MCP request context to extract caller information and binds it into the attestation proof, enabling traceability of which agent/user triggered which tool invocation.

Solves for

I need to know which agent or user triggered a specific tool call for accountabilityI want to bind caller identity to attestation proofs for non-repudiationI need to track tool invocations by agent/user for audit and compliance reporting

Best for

multi-agent systems needing accountability for tool calls

compliance scenarios requiring user/agent attribution

audit trails that must identify who initiated each tool call

Requires

MCP request context with caller identity information

Agent or user identity source (from MCP headers, JWT, or similar)

Limitations

Caller identity capture depends on MCP context — may be unavailable or incomplete in some scenarios

No built-in identity verification — assumes caller context is trustworthy

Identity format not standardized — may vary across different MCP implementations

What makes it unique

Integrates caller identity tracking directly into MCP tool call attestation, binding agent/user identity to each proof — enables end-to-end traceability from user action to tool invocation to result

vs alternatives

More integrated than separate identity logging because caller context is bound into cryptographic proofs; more practical than centralized identity services because it captures identity at the point of tool invocation

Capabilities are decomposed by AI analysis. Each maps to specific user intents and improves with match feedback.

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mcp-tool-registry-and-invocation-orchestration

1 shared capability

Best For

✓teams building AI agents with compliance requirements (finance, healthcare, legal)
✓developers implementing multi-agent systems with untrusted participants
✓builders needing audit trails for tool execution in production LLM applications
✓organizations requiring non-repudiation of AI-driven decisions
✓MCP server operators deploying multiple tools and needing uniform attestation
✓developers building MCP-based agent frameworks with built-in compliance
✓teams standardizing on attestation across heterogeneous tool ecosystems
✓compliance-heavy environments requiring non-repudiation of tool calls

Known Limitations

⚠Attestation adds latency to each tool call (exact overhead unknown from package metadata)
⚠Requires MCP-compatible tool registry — cannot attest non-MCP tool calls
⚠No built-in persistence layer — attestation proofs must be stored externally
⚠Verification logic must be implemented by consumer — package provides attestation generation only
⚠No standardized attestation format specified in public documentation — implementation details opaque
⚠Registry wrapping may introduce performance overhead proportional to tool count

Requirements

Node.js 16+ (typical for npm packages)MCP-compatible framework or runtime (Claude SDK, LangChain MCP integration, or custom MCP server)Cryptographic library support (Node.js crypto module or compatible alternative)MCP-compatible tool registry interfaceAccess to tool registry initialization codeNode.js environment with ES6 Proxy or equivalent metaprogramming supportNode.js crypto module or compatible cryptographic libraryShared secret or key pair for proof generation and verification

Input / Output

Accepts: MCP tool schema definitions, tool invocation parameters (any JSON-serializable type), caller/agent identity context, MCP tool definitions (schema + handler functions), tool invocation requests with parameters, tool name (string), tool arguments (JSON-serializable object), execution timestamp (ISO 8601 or Unix timestamp), caller/agent identity (string or object), execution result (any JSON-serializable type), MCP tool invocation context object, tool execution result, attestation proof object or string, tool metadata for comparison, cryptographic key for verification, MCP request context object, caller identity string or object

Produces: attestation proof object (structure unknown), metadata envelope wrapping tool call results, verifiable signature or token, wrapped tool definitions with attestation hooks, tool results with attestation metadata attached, cryptographic signature (hex or base64 string), HMAC token (hex or base64 string), proof object with signature + metadata, structured metadata object (JSON), serialized metadata string (JSON or similar), metadata envelope with timestamp, caller, tool name, args, result, boolean validation result (true/false), validation result object with details (valid, reason, metadata), error or exception on invalid proof, caller identity string or object, caller context bound into attestation metadata

UnfragileRank

Adoption24%(30% weight)

Quality14%(25% weight)

Ecosystem45%(25% weight)

Match Graph10%(15% weight)

Freshness75%(5% weight)

UnfragileRank is computed from adoption signals, documentation quality, ecosystem connectivity, match graph feedback, and freshness. No artifact can pay for a higher rank.

Type: MCP Server

6 capabilities

Visit @treeship/mcp→

Package Details

npm

Registry

0.9.4

Version

768

Weekly Downloads

About

Drop-in Treeship attestation for MCP tool calls

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Capabilities6 decomposed

mcp tool call attestation and verification

Medium confidence

Solves for

Best for

teams building AI agents with compliance requirements (finance, healthcare, legal)

developers implementing multi-agent systems with untrusted participants

builders needing audit trails for tool execution in production LLM applications

Requires

Node.js 16+ (typical for npm packages)

MCP-compatible framework or runtime (Claude SDK, LangChain MCP integration, or custom MCP server)

Cryptographic library support (Node.js crypto module or compatible alternative)

Limitations

Attestation adds latency to each tool call (exact overhead unknown from package metadata)

Requires MCP-compatible tool registry — cannot attest non-MCP tool calls

No built-in persistence layer — attestation proofs must be stored externally

What makes it unique

vs alternatives

mcp tool registry wrapping with attestation injection

Medium confidence

Solves for

Best for

MCP server operators deploying multiple tools and needing uniform attestation

developers building MCP-based agent frameworks with built-in compliance

teams standardizing on attestation across heterogeneous tool ecosystems

Requires

MCP-compatible tool registry interface

Access to tool registry initialization code

Node.js environment with ES6 Proxy or equivalent metaprogramming support

Limitations

Registry wrapping may introduce performance overhead proportional to tool count

Incompatible with tools that bypass the registry or use direct function references

Attestation metadata captured at registry level may not include tool-internal state or side effects

What makes it unique

vs alternatives

cryptographic proof generation for tool invocations

Medium confidence

Solves for

Best for

compliance-heavy environments requiring non-repudiation of tool calls

multi-party systems where tool calls must be verified by untrusted parties

audit scenarios requiring cryptographic proof of execution

Requires

Node.js crypto module or compatible cryptographic library

Shared secret or key pair for proof generation and verification

Deterministic serialization of tool metadata (JSON or similar)

Limitations

Proof generation adds computational overhead (signature/HMAC cost per call)

Proof format and algorithm not documented in public package metadata

No key rotation or management strategy specified

What makes it unique

vs alternatives

More robust than simple logging because proofs are tamper-evident; more lightweight than full blockchain solutions because it uses standard cryptography rather than distributed consensus

tool invocation metadata capture and serialization

Medium confidence

Solves for

Best for

audit and compliance teams needing structured tool call records

developers building observability/monitoring on top of MCP

organizations standardizing on tool call metadata formats

Requires

MCP tool invocation context with accessible metadata fields

Timestamp source (system clock or provided)

Caller identity context (from MCP request or agent framework)

Limitations

Metadata capture may miss tool-internal state or side effects not visible at MCP boundary

Serialization format not documented — may not be compatible with external audit systems

Caller identity capture depends on MCP context availability — may be incomplete in some scenarios

What makes it unique

vs alternatives

More complete than manual logging because it captures all MCP context automatically; more standardized than ad-hoc logging because metadata is serialized in a canonical format

attestation proof validation and verification

Medium confidence

Solves for

Best for

audit systems validating tool call proofs

compliance checkers verifying attestation chains

downstream systems receiving tool call attestations and needing to verify them

Requires

Cryptographic key (shared secret or public key) matching the proof generation key

Attestation proof object or serialized proof string

Original tool metadata for comparison (or reconstructed from proof)

Limitations

Verification requires access to the same cryptographic key used for proof generation

No built-in key distribution or management — keys must be managed externally

Verification logic may not be exposed as a public API (unknown from package metadata)

What makes it unique

vs alternatives

agent identity and caller context tracking

Medium confidence

Solves for

Best for

multi-agent systems needing accountability for tool calls

compliance scenarios requiring user/agent attribution

audit trails that must identify who initiated each tool call

Requires

MCP request context with caller identity information

Agent or user identity source (from MCP headers, JWT, or similar)

Limitations

Caller identity capture depends on MCP context — may be unavailable or incomplete in some scenarios

No built-in identity verification — assumes caller context is trustworthy

Identity format not standardized — may vary across different MCP implementations

What makes it unique

vs alternatives

Capabilities are decomposed by AI analysis. Each maps to specific user intents and improves with match feedback.

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@treeship/mcp

Capabilities6 decomposed

mcp tool call attestation and verification

mcp tool registry wrapping with attestation injection

cryptographic proof generation for tool invocations

tool invocation metadata capture and serialization

attestation proof validation and verification

agent identity and caller context tracking

Related Artifactssharing capabilities

mcp-security-hub

@msfeldstein/mcp-test-servers

octocode-mcp

@listo-ai/mcp-observability

mcp-runtime-guard

devmind-mcp

Best For

Known Limitations

Requirements

Input / Output

UnfragileRank

Package Details

About

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Alternatives to @treeship/mcp

Are you the builder of @treeship/mcp?

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Data Sources

@treeship/mcp

Capabilities6 decomposed

mcp tool call attestation and verification

mcp tool registry wrapping with attestation injection

cryptographic proof generation for tool invocations

tool invocation metadata capture and serialization

attestation proof validation and verification

agent identity and caller context tracking

Related Artifactssharing capabilities

mcp-security-hub

@msfeldstein/mcp-test-servers

octocode-mcp

@listo-ai/mcp-observability

mcp-runtime-guard

devmind-mcp

Best For

Known Limitations

Requirements

Input / Output

UnfragileRank

Package Details

About

Categories

Alternatives to @treeship/mcp

Are you the builder of @treeship/mcp?

Get the weekly brief

Data Sources