{"passport":{"unfragile":{"@version":"1.0","version":"2026-05","artifact":{"id":"npm_npm-agentic-name-servicesdk","slug":"npm-agentic-name-servicesdk","name":"@agentic-name-service/sdk","type":"mcp","url":"https://www.npmjs.com/package/@agentic-name-service/sdk","page_url":"https://unfragile.ai/npm-agentic-name-servicesdk","categories":["mcp-servers"],"tags":["agentic-name-service","ans","mcp","agent-authentication","trilateral-handshake"],"pricing":{"model":"open_source","free":true,"starting_price":null},"status":"active","verified":false},"capabilities":[{"id":"npm_npm-agentic-name-servicesdk__cap_0","uri":"capability://tool.use.integration.trilateral.agent.authentication.orchestration","name":"trilateral-agent-authentication-orchestration","description":"Orchestrates a three-party authentication handshake between an Agent, Gateway, and Guardian using MCP (Model Context Protocol) tool calls. The SDK manages the state machine for credential exchange, signature verification, and mutual authentication across distributed parties without centralizing trust. Implements a request-response pattern where the Agent initiates calls through the Gateway, which delegates verification to the Guardian, then returns authenticated tokens back through the MCP channel.","intents":["I need my agent to authenticate with external services without exposing credentials directly","I want to implement zero-trust authentication where no single party holds all credentials","I need to verify that both the agent and the service are legitimate before exchanging sensitive data","I want to use MCP as the transport layer for authentication without building custom protocols"],"best_for":["teams building multi-agent systems with distributed trust requirements","developers implementing zero-trust architectures for agent-to-service communication","organizations using MCP as their primary agent orchestration protocol"],"limitations":["Requires all three parties (Agent, Gateway, Guardian) to be MCP-compatible — no fallback to REST or gRPC","Adds latency for each authentication round-trip; not suitable for sub-100ms latency requirements","No built-in session persistence — requires external state store for long-lived authenticated sessions","Guardian availability is a hard dependency; no graceful degradation if Guardian is unreachable"],"requires":["Node.js 18+ or compatible JavaScript runtime","MCP server implementation for Gateway and Guardian","Cryptographic library support (Node.js crypto or equivalent)","Network connectivity between Agent, Gateway, and Guardian"],"input_types":["agent credentials (API keys, tokens, certificates)","service identifiers (Gateway URL, Guardian endpoint)","MCP tool schemas for authentication endpoints"],"output_types":["authenticated session tokens","signed verification proofs","MCP tool call results with auth headers"],"categories":["tool-use-integration","safety-moderation"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"npm_npm-agentic-name-servicesdk__cap_1","uri":"capability://tool.use.integration.mcp.tool.call.routing.with.auth.context","name":"mcp-tool-call-routing-with-auth-context","description":"Routes MCP tool calls from agents through the Gateway with automatic injection of authentication context derived from the trilateral handshake. The SDK wraps the native MCP tool invocation mechanism, intercepts calls, appends signed auth tokens to the request metadata, and validates response signatures before returning results to the agent. Implements a middleware pattern that is transparent to the agent's tool-calling logic.","intents":["I want to make MCP tool calls but have authentication credentials automatically included without manual header management","I need to verify that tool responses came from a legitimate Guardian-verified source","I want to enforce authentication on every tool call without modifying my agent's core logic"],"best_for":["agents that make frequent MCP tool calls and need per-call authentication","teams building agent frameworks that abstract away authentication concerns","developers who want authentication to be declarative rather than imperative"],"limitations":["Only works with MCP-compatible tools; cannot route to REST APIs or gRPC services directly","Auth context injection adds ~50-100ms overhead per tool call due to signature generation","Requires pre-established authentication session; cannot perform on-demand authentication within a tool call","No built-in retry logic for failed authentication — caller must implement exponential backoff"],"requires":["Active authenticated session from trilateral-agent-authentication-orchestration capability","MCP server with tool definitions that accept metadata headers","Cryptographic keys for signing and verifying auth tokens"],"input_types":["MCP tool call requests (tool name, parameters)","authentication session token from previous handshake","tool metadata (endpoint, required permissions)"],"output_types":["MCP tool call results with verified signatures","authentication error responses if signature validation fails"],"categories":["tool-use-integration","safety-moderation"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"npm_npm-agentic-name-servicesdk__cap_10","uri":"capability://safety.moderation.audit.logging.of.authentication.events","name":"audit-logging-of-authentication-events","description":"Records detailed audit logs of all authentication events (credential submission, Guardian verification, token generation, session renewal, expiration) with timestamps, actor information, and outcomes. The SDK provides structured logging hooks that emit events at each stage of the trilateral handshake, allowing downstream systems to capture and analyze authentication activity. Implements a pluggable logger interface that supports multiple backends (console, file, remote syslog, cloud logging services).","intents":["I need to audit which agents authenticated and when for compliance purposes","I want to investigate authentication failures by reviewing detailed logs of each handshake step","I need to detect suspicious authentication patterns (repeated failures, unusual agents) by analyzing audit logs"],"best_for":["organizations with compliance requirements (SOC2, HIPAA, PCI-DSS) that mandate authentication audit trails","security teams investigating authentication incidents","systems that need to detect and alert on suspicious authentication patterns"],"limitations":["Audit logging adds ~5-10ms per authentication event due to log serialization and I/O","Sensitive data (credentials, tokens) must be carefully redacted from logs to avoid exposing secrets","Log volume can be high in systems with frequent authentication; requires log aggregation and retention policies","Audit logs are only as trustworthy as the logging backend; compromised logging system can hide authentication attacks"],"requires":["Logger implementation (console, file, or remote backend)","Structured logging format (JSON or equivalent)","Log retention and aggregation infrastructure"],"input_types":["authentication events (credential submission, verification, token generation, renewal, expiration)","event metadata (timestamp, actor, outcome, error details)"],"output_types":["structured audit logs (JSON with standardized fields)","log events emitted to configured logger backends"],"categories":["safety-moderation","automation-workflow"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"npm_npm-agentic-name-servicesdk__cap_11","uri":"capability://automation.workflow.multi.credential.agent.support","name":"multi-credential-agent-support","description":"Enables a single agent to authenticate using multiple credentials (e.g., primary API key + backup certificate) and automatically fall back to alternative credentials if the primary credential fails. The SDK maintains a credential chain, attempts authentication with each credential in order, and stops at the first successful authentication. Implements a credential fallback pattern that improves resilience for agents with multiple credential sources.","intents":["I want my agent to have a backup credential in case the primary credential is revoked","I need to support credential rotation by providing both old and new credentials during the transition period","I want my agent to automatically try alternative credentials if authentication fails"],"best_for":["agents with multiple credential sources (e.g., environment variable + key manager)","systems undergoing credential rotation that need to support both old and new credentials temporarily","high-availability agents that need fallback authentication paths"],"limitations":["Credential chain evaluation adds latency proportional to the number of credentials; testing 5 credentials could add 500ms+ if each fails","Failed authentication attempts with invalid credentials are logged and audited, creating noise in audit logs","No built-in credential priority or weighting; credentials are tried in order regardless of freshness or validity","Fallback to alternative credentials may mask underlying authentication issues (e.g., if primary credential is revoked, fallback succeeds but doesn't alert operator)"],"requires":["Multiple credentials in one of: API key, certificate, OIDC token","Credential chain configuration (ordered list of credentials to try)"],"input_types":["credential chain (array of credentials in fallback order)","fallback policy (stop at first success, try all, etc.)"],"output_types":["authentication result (successful credential, token)","fallback metadata (which credential succeeded, how many attempts)"],"categories":["automation-workflow","safety-moderation"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"npm_npm-agentic-name-servicesdk__cap_12","uri":"capability://safety.moderation.scope.based.authorization.enforcement","name":"scope-based-authorization-enforcement","description":"Enforces fine-grained authorization based on scopes embedded in the authenticated session token. The SDK extracts scopes from the Guardian's verification proof, compares requested tool scopes against authorized scopes, and rejects tool calls that exceed the agent's authorization level. Implements a scope-matching pattern that supports both exact scope matching and wildcard scope patterns (e.g., 'tools:read:*' matches 'tools:read:users' and 'tools:read:data').","intents":["I want to restrict my agent to only call specific tools based on verified scopes","I need to enforce fine-grained permissions (e.g., read-only vs read-write) for different tool categories","I want to prevent my agent from calling tools it is not authorized for, even if the tool is available"],"best_for":["systems with fine-grained authorization requirements (e.g., agents with different permission levels)","multi-tenant systems where agents need different permissions per tenant","organizations with strict least-privilege policies"],"limitations":["Scope enforcement adds ~5-10ms per tool call for scope matching","Scopes are determined at authentication time; cannot grant new scopes to an agent without re-authentication","Scope patterns are limited to wildcard matching; cannot express complex authorization rules (e.g., 'read-only on Mondays')","No built-in scope discovery; agents must know which scopes they need before authentication"],"requires":["Authenticated session token with embedded scopes from Guardian","Tool definitions with required scopes","Scope matching logic (exact or wildcard)"],"input_types":["authenticated session token with scopes","tool call request with required scopes"],"output_types":["authorization decision (allowed/denied)","authorization error with details about missing scopes"],"categories":["safety-moderation","tool-use-integration"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"npm_npm-agentic-name-servicesdk__cap_2","uri":"capability://tool.use.integration.gateway.agent.credential.exchange","name":"gateway-agent-credential-exchange","description":"Manages the first leg of the trilateral handshake where the Agent submits its credentials to the Gateway via an MCP tool call. The SDK encapsulates the agent's identity (API key, certificate, or token) in a standardized credential envelope, sends it through the Gateway's MCP endpoint, and receives a challenge or intermediate token. Implements credential normalization to support multiple credential types (symmetric keys, asymmetric certificates, OIDC tokens) without requiring the agent to know the Gateway's preferred format.","intents":["I need to send my agent's credentials to the Gateway in a format it understands","I want to support multiple credential types without hardcoding format conversions","I need to receive a challenge or intermediate token that I can forward to the Guardian"],"best_for":["agents with heterogeneous credential types (keys, certs, tokens)","teams building credential abstraction layers","systems that need to support credential rotation without code changes"],"limitations":["Credential envelope serialization adds ~20-30ms per exchange","No built-in credential caching — each exchange requires full serialization","Supports only credentials that can be serialized to JSON; binary credentials require base64 encoding","Gateway must implement the credential-exchange MCP tool; no fallback if tool is missing"],"requires":["Agent credentials in one of: API key (string), certificate (PEM format), OIDC token (JWT)","Gateway with MCP server exposing credential-exchange tool","JSON serialization support in runtime"],"input_types":["agent credentials (API key string, PEM certificate, JWT token)","credential type identifier (api-key, certificate, oidc-token)"],"output_types":["credential envelope (JSON with normalized format)","challenge or intermediate token from Gateway"],"categories":["tool-use-integration","safety-moderation"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"npm_npm-agentic-name-servicesdk__cap_3","uri":"capability://tool.use.integration.guardian.signature.verification.delegation","name":"guardian-signature-verification-delegation","description":"Handles the second leg of the trilateral handshake by forwarding the Gateway's challenge to the Guardian for cryptographic verification. The SDK constructs a verification request containing the agent's credentials, the Gateway's challenge, and metadata about the authentication context, sends it through the Guardian's MCP endpoint, and receives a signed verification proof. Implements a delegation pattern where the Guardian acts as a trusted third party that validates the agent's legitimacy without the Gateway needing to store or verify credentials directly.","intents":["I need an independent party to verify my agent's credentials without the Gateway holding that verification logic","I want to generate a cryptographic proof that the Guardian has verified my agent","I need to support credential verification policies that change without updating the Gateway"],"best_for":["systems with strict separation of concerns between Gateway and verification logic","organizations with centralized credential management (Guardian) and distributed gateways","teams that need to audit which Guardian verified which agent authentication"],"limitations":["Guardian becomes a critical dependency — if Guardian is down, authentication fails completely","Verification round-trip adds 100-300ms latency depending on Guardian response time","No caching of verification proofs — each authentication requires a fresh Guardian call","Requires Guardian to have access to credential policies and verification rules; no local fallback"],"requires":["Guardian with MCP server exposing signature-verification tool","Agent credentials and Gateway challenge from previous steps","Cryptographic library for proof validation (Node.js crypto or equivalent)"],"input_types":["agent credentials (from gateway-agent-credential-exchange)","Gateway challenge (from Gateway's credential-exchange response)","authentication context metadata (timestamp, agent ID, requested scopes)"],"output_types":["signed verification proof (JWT or similar)","Guardian's cryptographic signature","verification metadata (expiration, scopes, policies applied)"],"categories":["tool-use-integration","safety-moderation"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"npm_npm-agentic-name-servicesdk__cap_4","uri":"capability://tool.use.integration.authenticated.session.token.generation","name":"authenticated-session-token-generation","description":"Synthesizes a final authenticated session token after both the Gateway and Guardian have validated the agent. The SDK combines the Gateway's intermediate token and the Guardian's verification proof into a single session token that encodes the agent's identity, verified scopes, and expiration time. Implements a token composition pattern where the final token is cryptographically bound to both the Gateway and Guardian's signatures, preventing token forgery or scope escalation.","intents":["I need a single token that proves my agent has passed trilateral authentication","I want the token to include verified scopes so I can enforce fine-grained permissions","I need the token to be cryptographically bound to both Gateway and Guardian so it cannot be forged"],"best_for":["agents that need to prove authentication status to multiple downstream services","systems implementing fine-grained authorization based on verified scopes","teams that need to audit which parties verified each authentication"],"limitations":["Token generation adds ~30-50ms per authentication due to signature composition","Token size grows with each additional signature; may exceed HTTP header size limits for deeply nested authentications","No built-in token refresh mechanism — expired tokens require full re-authentication","Token format is specific to ANS; cannot be used with standard JWT validators without custom claims parsing"],"requires":["Gateway's intermediate token from gateway-agent-credential-exchange","Guardian's verification proof from guardian-signature-verification-delegation","Cryptographic keys for composing signatures"],"input_types":["Gateway intermediate token","Guardian verification proof","agent identity and requested scopes"],"output_types":["authenticated session token (JWT or custom format)","token metadata (expiration, scopes, issuer information)"],"categories":["tool-use-integration","safety-moderation"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"npm_npm-agentic-name-servicesdk__cap_5","uri":"capability://data.processing.analysis.agent.identity.resolution.from.credentials","name":"agent-identity-resolution-from-credentials","description":"Extracts and normalizes agent identity information from raw credentials (API keys, certificates, or tokens) into a standardized agent profile. The SDK parses credential metadata, resolves the agent's name, organization, and capabilities from a credential registry, and validates that the credential format matches the expected schema. Implements a credential-to-identity mapping that supports multiple credential sources (self-signed, CA-signed, OIDC-issued) without requiring the agent to explicitly declare its identity.","intents":["I need to extract my agent's identity from my credentials without manually parsing them","I want the system to resolve my agent's capabilities and permissions from my credential metadata","I need to support agents with different credential formats but consistent identity resolution"],"best_for":["systems with diverse agent populations using different credential types","teams building agent registries that need to map credentials to agent profiles","organizations that want identity resolution to be automatic and schema-driven"],"limitations":["Requires credential registry to be pre-populated with agent profiles; no dynamic agent registration","Identity resolution fails if credential metadata is missing or malformed — no graceful fallback to generic identity","Supports only credentials with embedded metadata; cannot resolve identity from opaque tokens without external lookup","Registry lookups add ~50-100ms per authentication if registry is remote"],"requires":["Credential registry (local or remote) mapping credentials to agent profiles","Credentials with embedded metadata (certificate CN/SAN, JWT claims, API key metadata)","Schema definition for agent profile structure"],"input_types":["raw credentials (API key, certificate, JWT token)","credential type identifier"],"output_types":["agent profile (name, organization, capabilities, permissions)","credential validation result (valid/invalid with reason)"],"categories":["data-processing-analysis","safety-moderation"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"npm_npm-agentic-name-servicesdk__cap_6","uri":"capability://safety.moderation.mcp.tool.schema.validation.for.auth.endpoints","name":"mcp-tool-schema-validation-for-auth-endpoints","description":"Validates that MCP tool schemas for authentication endpoints (credential-exchange, signature-verification) conform to the ANS specification before attempting to use them. The SDK inspects the tool's input/output schemas, parameter types, and required fields, and rejects tools that don't match the expected authentication interface. Implements a schema-driven validation pattern that prevents runtime errors from misconfigured authentication tools and provides clear error messages about schema mismatches.","intents":["I want to catch authentication tool configuration errors at startup, not at runtime","I need to verify that my Gateway and Guardian expose the correct MCP tool schemas","I want clear error messages if an authentication tool is missing required parameters"],"best_for":["teams deploying ANS in production and need to validate configurations before going live","developers debugging authentication failures caused by misconfigured tools","organizations with strict deployment validation requirements"],"limitations":["Schema validation only checks structure, not runtime behavior — a tool can pass validation but still fail at execution","Validation adds ~20-50ms startup overhead per authentication tool","Does not validate tool implementation details (e.g., whether Guardian actually verifies credentials); only validates schema conformance","Custom tool implementations may have valid schemas that don't match ANS expectations — validation cannot detect semantic mismatches"],"requires":["MCP server with tool definitions for authentication endpoints","ANS schema specification (JSON Schema or equivalent)","Access to tool metadata from MCP server"],"input_types":["MCP tool schemas (from MCP server introspection)","ANS specification schema"],"output_types":["validation result (pass/fail)","detailed error messages listing schema mismatches"],"categories":["safety-moderation","tool-use-integration"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"npm_npm-agentic-name-servicesdk__cap_7","uri":"capability://data.processing.analysis.credential.type.detection.and.normalization","name":"credential-type-detection-and-normalization","description":"Automatically detects the type of credential provided (API key, certificate, OIDC token, etc.) and normalizes it into a standard format for transmission to the Gateway. The SDK uses heuristics and format analysis to identify credential types without requiring explicit type declaration, then applies type-specific normalization (e.g., PEM parsing for certificates, JWT decoding for tokens). Implements a format-agnostic credential handling pattern that reduces boilerplate for agents with different credential sources.","intents":["I want to pass my credentials to the SDK without specifying the type explicitly","I need the SDK to automatically parse and normalize my credentials regardless of format","I want to support agents with different credential types without code changes"],"best_for":["agents with heterogeneous credential sources (environment variables, files, key managers)","teams building credential abstraction layers that hide format details","systems that need to support credential migration without code changes"],"limitations":["Detection heuristics may fail for ambiguous formats (e.g., a long string could be a token or an API key); requires explicit type hints for edge cases","Normalization adds ~10-20ms per credential due to parsing and validation","Does not support encrypted credentials; credentials must be in plaintext or base64-encoded","Custom credential formats require explicit type registration; cannot auto-detect proprietary formats"],"requires":["Credentials in one of: plaintext API key, PEM-encoded certificate, JWT token, base64-encoded binary","Cryptographic library for parsing certificates and tokens"],"input_types":["credential string (API key, certificate, token, or base64-encoded data)"],"output_types":["normalized credential object (type, parsed metadata, serialized form)","detection confidence score (if detection was ambiguous)"],"categories":["data-processing-analysis","tool-use-integration"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"npm_npm-agentic-name-servicesdk__cap_8","uri":"capability://automation.workflow.authentication.session.lifecycle.management","name":"authentication-session-lifecycle-management","description":"Manages the complete lifecycle of an authenticated session from creation through expiration and renewal. The SDK tracks session state (active, expired, revoked), enforces expiration policies, and provides hooks for session renewal before expiration. Implements a state machine pattern with explicit transitions (created → active → expiring → expired or revoked), allowing agents to proactively refresh sessions before they expire and preventing use of expired tokens.","intents":["I need to know when my authentication session is about to expire so I can refresh it","I want to prevent my agent from using expired authentication tokens","I need to track which sessions are active and which have been revoked"],"best_for":["long-running agents that need to maintain authenticated sessions across multiple tool calls","systems with strict session expiration policies","teams that need to audit session lifecycle events for compliance"],"limitations":["No built-in session persistence — session state is lost if the SDK is restarted; requires external state store for durability","Session renewal requires re-authentication with Gateway and Guardian; cannot refresh tokens without full handshake","No distributed session invalidation — revoking a session on one SDK instance does not affect other instances","Expiration tracking is local to the SDK; does not detect if Guardian has revoked the session server-side"],"requires":["Active authenticated session from authenticated-session-token-generation","Timer or scheduler for tracking expiration and renewal deadlines","Access to Gateway and Guardian for session renewal"],"input_types":["authenticated session token","session expiration time","renewal policy (e.g., refresh 5 minutes before expiration)"],"output_types":["session state (active, expiring, expired, revoked)","renewal events (session-expiring, session-expired, session-revoked)","new session token after renewal"],"categories":["automation-workflow","safety-moderation"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"npm_npm-agentic-name-servicesdk__cap_9","uri":"capability://automation.workflow.error.recovery.and.retry.logic.for.authentication","name":"error-recovery-and-retry-logic-for-authentication","description":"Implements configurable retry logic and error recovery strategies for authentication failures at each stage of the trilateral handshake. The SDK distinguishes between transient errors (network timeouts, temporary Guardian unavailability) and permanent errors (invalid credentials, schema mismatches), and applies appropriate recovery strategies (exponential backoff for transient, fail-fast for permanent). Implements a circuit-breaker pattern to prevent cascading failures if Guardian or Gateway becomes unavailable.","intents":["I want my agent to automatically retry authentication if the Guardian is temporarily unavailable","I need to distinguish between transient and permanent authentication failures","I want to prevent my agent from hammering the Gateway with retries if authentication is permanently broken"],"best_for":["agents deployed in unreliable network environments with intermittent Gateway/Guardian availability","systems that need to gracefully degrade when authentication services are partially unavailable","teams that want to avoid manual intervention for transient authentication failures"],"limitations":["Retry logic adds latency for transient failures; exponential backoff can delay authentication by several seconds","Circuit breaker may reject valid authentication requests if it incorrectly classifies a transient error as permanent","No built-in fallback authentication mechanism; if all retries fail, authentication fails completely","Retry configuration is global; cannot have different retry policies for different authentication endpoints"],"requires":["Configurable retry policy (max retries, backoff strategy, timeout)","Error classification logic to distinguish transient from permanent errors","Timer or scheduler for implementing exponential backoff"],"input_types":["authentication error (type, message, source)","retry policy configuration"],"output_types":["retry decision (retry, fail-fast, circuit-break)","retry metadata (attempt number, next retry time, total elapsed time)"],"categories":["automation-workflow","safety-moderation"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0}],"trust":{"score":35,"verified":false,"data_access_risk":"high","permissions":["Node.js 18+ or compatible JavaScript runtime","MCP server implementation for Gateway and Guardian","Cryptographic library support (Node.js crypto or equivalent)","Network connectivity between Agent, Gateway, and Guardian","Active authenticated session from trilateral-agent-authentication-orchestration capability","MCP server with tool definitions that accept metadata headers","Cryptographic keys for signing and verifying auth tokens","Logger implementation (console, file, or remote backend)","Structured logging format (JSON or equivalent)","Log retention and aggregation infrastructure"],"failure_modes":["Requires all three parties (Agent, Gateway, Guardian) to be MCP-compatible — no fallback to REST or gRPC","Adds latency for each authentication round-trip; not suitable for sub-100ms latency requirements","No built-in session persistence — requires external state store for long-lived authenticated sessions","Guardian availability is a hard dependency; no graceful degradation if Guardian is unreachable","Only works with MCP-compatible tools; cannot route to REST APIs or gRPC services directly","Auth context injection adds ~50-100ms overhead per tool call due to signature generation","Requires pre-established authentication session; cannot perform on-demand authentication within a tool call","No built-in retry logic for failed authentication — caller must implement exponential backoff","Audit logging adds ~5-10ms per authentication event due to log serialization and I/O","Sensitive data (credentials, tokens) must be carefully redacted from logs to avoid exposing secrets","builder identity is not verified yet","no observed match outcomes yet"],"rank_breakdown":{"adoption":0.05,"quality":0.5,"ecosystem":0.45,"match_graph":0.25,"freshness":0.75,"weights":{"adoption":0.25,"quality":0.25,"ecosystem":0.15,"match_graph":0.23,"freshness":0.12}},"observed_outcomes":{"matches":0,"success_rate":0,"avg_confidence":0,"top_intents":[],"last_matched_at":null},"maintenance":{"status":"active","updated_at":"2026-05-24T12:16:23.903Z","last_scraped_at":"2026-05-03T14:24:09.137Z","last_commit":null},"community":{"stars":null,"forks":null,"weekly_downloads":null,"model_downloads":null,"model_likes":null}},"distribution":{"claim_url":"https://unfragile.ai/submit?claim=npm-agentic-name-servicesdk","compare_url":"https://unfragile.ai/compare?artifact=npm-agentic-name-servicesdk"}},"signature":"/A1cYgpZI+8gthJo4PJlpAUFQuGiLT1Na7OvwfxPyqnKkniFj8qONveIdTJZnLPbmVP6fkIqHTSy1hElV2BDCA==","signedAt":"2026-06-22T07:54:36.517Z","signedBy":"unfragile.ai","version":1},"_links":{"self":"https://unfragile.ai/api/v1/passport/npm-agentic-name-servicesdk","artifact":"https://unfragile.ai/npm-agentic-name-servicesdk","verify":"https://unfragile.ai/api/v1/verify?slug=npm-agentic-name-servicesdk","publicKey":"https://unfragile.ai/api/v1/trust-passport-public-key","spec":"https://unfragile.ai/trust","schema":"https://unfragile.ai/schema.json","docs":"https://unfragile.ai/docs"}}