{"passport":{"unfragile":{"@version":"1.0","version":"2026-05","artifact":{"id":"github_mcp-affaan-m-agentshield","slug":"mcp-affaan-m-agentshield","name":"agentshield","type":"cli","url":"https://github.com/affaan-m/agentshield","page_url":"https://unfragile.ai/mcp-affaan-m-agentshield","categories":["code-review-security"],"tags":["ai-agent","anthropic","claude-code","hackathon","mcp","opus","security"],"pricing":{"model":"open_source","free":true,"starting_price":null},"status":"active","verified":false},"capabilities":[{"id":"github_mcp-affaan-m-agentshield__cap_0","uri":"capability://safety.moderation.static.configuration.vulnerability.scanning.with.102.rule.registry","name":"static configuration vulnerability scanning with 102+ rule registry","description":"Discovers Claude-related configuration files (settings.json, mcp.json, CLAUDE.md) across the filesystem and runs them through a curated registry of 102+ static analysis rules organized by threat category (secrets, permissions, hooks, MCP, prompt injection). Each rule produces a Finding object with severity level, vulnerability description, and remediation steps, enabling systematic detection of misconfigurations before runtime.","intents":["scan my agent configuration files for hardcoded secrets and API keys","identify overly permissive tool permissions in my MCP setup","detect hook injection vulnerabilities in PreToolUse and SessionStart handlers","audit my entire agent codebase for security misconfigurations in one pass"],"best_for":["teams building Claude Code agents who need pre-deployment security validation","developers integrating MCP servers and want to prevent supply chain attacks","organizations enforcing security baselines across multiple agent configurations"],"limitations":["static analysis only — cannot detect runtime behavioral exploits or zero-day patterns not in rule registry","requires files to be discoverable on local filesystem — no remote scanning of cloud-hosted configs","rule false-positive rate documented in false-positive-audit.md; some rules may flag legitimate patterns"],"requires":["Node.js 18+","TypeScript runtime or compiled JavaScript","read access to agent configuration directories"],"input_types":["JSON configuration files (settings.json, mcp.json)","Markdown files (CLAUDE.md with prompt definitions)","YAML/TOML agent configs"],"output_types":["structured Finding objects with severity, description, remediation","JSON/CSV/HTML reports with aggregated vulnerability counts","exit codes for CI/CD integration"],"categories":["safety-moderation","code-review-security"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"github_mcp-affaan-m-agentshield__cap_1","uri":"capability://safety.moderation.hardcoded.secrets.detection.with.multi.provider.pattern.matching","name":"hardcoded secrets detection with multi-provider pattern matching","description":"Scans configuration files for exposed API keys, tokens, and private keys using pattern matching rules for Anthropic, OpenAI, AWS, and other providers. Detects both common formats (e.g., sk-* prefixes) and entropy-based anomalies in string values, flagging findings with severity levels and remediation steps recommending environment variable substitution or secret management tools.","intents":["find accidentally committed API keys in my agent configuration before pushing to GitHub","detect hardcoded tokens in MCP server definitions that could be exfiltrated","audit existing configurations for legacy secrets that should be rotated","enforce a policy that no secrets appear in version control"],"best_for":["developers working with Claude Code who want to prevent credential leakage","DevOps teams implementing pre-commit hooks for agent configuration validation","security teams auditing third-party agent configurations for exposure risks"],"limitations":["pattern-based detection may miss obfuscated or custom secret formats not in the rule set","cannot detect secrets already rotated or invalidated — only identifies presence","high false-positive rate on legitimate long alphanumeric strings; requires manual review"],"requires":["Node.js 18+","read access to configuration files","optional: integration with secret scanning tools (git-secrets, TruffleHog)"],"input_types":["JSON configuration files","environment variable definitions","markdown prompt definitions"],"output_types":["Finding objects with secret type, location, and remediation","severity-tagged reports (CRITICAL for API keys, HIGH for tokens)"],"categories":["safety-moderation","data-processing-analysis"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"github_mcp-affaan-m-agentshield__cap_10","uri":"capability://safety.moderation.supply.chain.verification.with.source.authenticity.and.maintenance.status.checks","name":"supply chain verification with source authenticity and maintenance status checks","description":"Validates the authenticity and trustworthiness of MCP server sources by cross-referencing against known-good registries, checking maintainer reputation, and verifying code signatures. Assesses maintenance status (last update, active development, community engagement) to identify abandoned or unmaintained servers that pose supply chain risks. Integrates with GitHub API to gather maintainer and repository metadata.","intents":["verify that MCP servers in my configuration come from trusted sources","identify unmaintained or abandoned MCP servers that pose security risks","check the reputation and activity of MCP server maintainers","ensure my agent only uses actively maintained dependencies"],"best_for":["teams using community MCP servers who need to validate trustworthiness","organizations with strict supply chain security policies","developers building agent ecosystems with multiple dependencies"],"limitations":["verification relies on external data sources (GitHub, registries) — may be incomplete or outdated","cannot detect compromised maintainer accounts or supply chain attacks after initial verification","reputation assessment is heuristic-based and may not reflect actual security posture","requires network access to GitHub API and other external services"],"requires":["Node.js 18+","MCP server definitions with source information","GitHub API token (optional, for higher rate limits)","network access to GitHub and other registries","--deep flag or --supply-chain flag"],"input_types":["MCP server configurations with source URLs","package.json or lock files with dependency information"],"output_types":["supply chain risk scores","maintainer reputation assessment","maintenance status (last update, activity level)","Finding objects for untrusted or unmaintained servers"],"categories":["safety-moderation","data-processing-analysis"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"github_mcp-affaan-m-agentshield__cap_11","uri":"capability://data.processing.analysis.vulnerability.severity.scoring.and.risk.prioritization.engine","name":"vulnerability severity scoring and risk prioritization engine","description":"Aggregates findings from all scanning modules (static rules, deep scan, taint analysis, injection testing, sandbox monitoring) and computes a composite vulnerability severity score based on exploitability, impact, and blast radius. Prioritizes findings for remediation using a scoring engine that considers attack complexity, required privileges, and potential damage. Generates risk reports with remediation guidance ranked by severity.","intents":["understand which vulnerabilities in my agent are most critical to fix","prioritize remediation efforts based on actual risk, not just rule severity","get a composite security score for my agent configuration","communicate security posture to stakeholders with quantified risk metrics"],"best_for":["security teams managing vulnerability remediation across multiple agents","developers deciding which findings to fix first","organizations reporting security metrics to compliance and leadership"],"limitations":["scoring is heuristic-based and may not reflect actual risk in specific contexts","does not account for compensating controls outside AgentShield's scope","risk prioritization assumes standard threat model — may not apply to specialized deployments","scoring weights are fixed — cannot be customized per organization"],"requires":["Node.js 18+","findings from scanning modules","optional: organizational risk context for custom scoring"],"input_types":["Finding objects from all scanning modules","agent configuration context"],"output_types":["composite vulnerability severity scores (0-100)","prioritized finding lists ranked by risk","risk reports with remediation guidance","security scorecards for compliance reporting"],"categories":["data-processing-analysis","safety-moderation"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"github_mcp-affaan-m-agentshield__cap_12","uri":"capability://safety.moderation.miniclaw.secure.agent.runtime.with.tool.whitelist.and.egress.firewall","name":"miniclaw secure agent runtime with tool whitelist and egress firewall","description":"Provides a hardened, minimal agent runtime (MiniClaw) that enforces security policies at execution time. Implements a tool whitelist that only allows explicitly approved tools, path sanitization for file access, and an egress firewall that prevents unauthorized network requests. Acts as a secure alternative to standard agent setups, with hooks into the agent lifecycle to validate tool calls against a RuntimePolicy before execution.","intents":["run my agent in a hardened runtime that enforces security policies","ensure my agent can only execute whitelisted tools","prevent my agent from making unauthorized network requests","enforce path restrictions for file access at runtime"],"best_for":["teams deploying agents in production who need runtime security enforcement","organizations with strict security requirements (financial, healthcare, government)","developers building multi-tenant agent platforms"],"limitations":["MiniClaw adds runtime overhead — may impact agent performance","tool whitelist must be manually maintained — requires operational effort","egress firewall may block legitimate agent use cases","does not protect against vulnerabilities in whitelisted tools themselves"],"requires":["Node.js 18+","MiniClaw runtime installation","RuntimePolicy definition with tool whitelist and network rules","agent configuration compatible with MiniClaw"],"input_types":["RuntimePolicy definitions","tool whitelist configuration","network egress rules"],"output_types":["enforced tool call validation","blocked tool execution with policy violation logs","network request filtering"],"categories":["safety-moderation","automation-workflow"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"github_mcp-affaan-m-agentshield__cap_13","uri":"capability://automation.workflow.ci.cd.integration.with.github.actions.and.baseline.quality.gates","name":"ci/cd integration with github actions and baseline quality gates","description":"Provides GitHub Action integration that runs AgentShield scans automatically on pull requests and commits. Supports baseline comparison to detect regressions (new vulnerabilities introduced), quality gates that fail builds if severity thresholds are exceeded, and watch mode that alerts on configuration changes. Integrates with GitHub's status checks and pull request reviews to block merges with critical vulnerabilities.","intents":["automatically scan my agent configuration on every commit or pull request","prevent merging of code that introduces new security vulnerabilities","enforce security baselines and prevent regression","get alerts when my agent configuration changes in risky ways"],"best_for":["teams using GitHub for version control who want automated security scanning","organizations enforcing security policies across multiple agent projects","developers wanting shift-left security (catch issues early in development)"],"limitations":["GitHub Action integration requires GitHub repository — not suitable for other VCS platforms","baseline comparison requires historical scan data — not available on first run","quality gates are binary (pass/fail) — cannot enforce graduated policies","watch mode requires continuous GitHub Action execution — adds CI/CD costs"],"requires":["GitHub repository with Actions enabled","GitHub Action workflow file configuration","optional: GitHub App installation for enhanced permissions","optional: baseline configuration for regression detection"],"input_types":["agent configuration files in repository","pull request metadata","commit history"],"output_types":["GitHub status checks (pass/fail)","pull request comments with findings","GitHub Action logs with detailed scan results","alerts on configuration changes"],"categories":["automation-workflow","safety-moderation"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"github_mcp-affaan-m-agentshield__cap_14","uri":"capability://code.generation.editing.auto.fix.engine.with.configuration.remediation.and.policy.initialization","name":"auto-fix engine with configuration remediation and policy initialization","description":"Automatically generates and applies fixes for detected vulnerabilities, including moving hardcoded secrets to environment variables, removing wildcard tool permissions, sanitizing hook code, and pinning MCP server versions. Provides an initialization mode that creates secure baseline configurations from scratch. Uses code transformation patterns to modify configuration files safely while preserving structure and comments.","intents":["automatically fix detected vulnerabilities in my agent configuration","move hardcoded secrets to environment variables","remove overly permissive tool permissions","initialize a new agent configuration with security best practices"],"best_for":["developers wanting quick remediation of detected vulnerabilities","teams initializing new agent projects with secure defaults","organizations automating security compliance across multiple agents"],"limitations":["auto-fix may not be appropriate for all vulnerabilities — requires manual review","code transformations may not preserve all formatting or comments","cannot fix vulnerabilities that require architectural changes","auto-fix may introduce new issues if applied without testing"],"requires":["Node.js 18+","write access to configuration files","optional: --fix flag to apply transformations","optional: --init flag to initialize new configuration"],"input_types":["agent configuration files","Finding objects with remediation suggestions"],"output_types":["modified configuration files with fixes applied","transformation logs showing what was changed","initialized baseline configuration"],"categories":["code-generation-editing","automation-workflow"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"github_mcp-affaan-m-agentshield__cap_15","uri":"capability://safety.moderation.organizational.policy.enforcement.with.custom.rules.and.compliance.reporting","name":"organizational policy enforcement with custom rules and compliance reporting","description":"Enables organizations to define custom security policies that extend AgentShield's built-in rules, enforcing organization-specific requirements (e.g., 'all MCP servers must be from approved registry', 'no external network access'). Generates compliance reports showing which agents meet organizational policies and which require remediation. Integrates with policy management systems to enforce policies across multiple agent projects.","intents":["enforce my organization's security policies across all agent projects","define custom rules specific to my organization's threat model","generate compliance reports for auditors and leadership","ensure all agents meet organizational security baselines"],"best_for":["large organizations with multiple agent projects and security requirements","teams with compliance obligations (SOC2, ISO27001, HIPAA)","enterprises wanting to enforce consistent security policies"],"limitations":["custom policy definition requires security expertise","policy enforcement is only as good as the rules defined","compliance reporting requires manual interpretation of results","policies may conflict with legitimate agent use cases"],"requires":["Node.js 18+","organizational policy definitions","optional: policy management system integration","optional: compliance reporting infrastructure"],"input_types":["custom policy definitions","agent configurations from multiple projects","compliance requirements"],"output_types":["compliance reports showing policy adherence","policy violation findings","remediation guidance for non-compliant agents"],"categories":["safety-moderation","automation-workflow"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"github_mcp-affaan-m-agentshield__cap_16","uri":"capability://automation.workflow.skills.health.system.with.dependency.tracking.and.update.notifications","name":"skills health system with dependency tracking and update notifications","description":"Monitors the health of MCP servers and agent skills by tracking dependency versions, maintenance status, and security updates. Provides notifications when new versions are available, when dependencies become unmaintained, or when security patches are released. Maintains a skills registry that tracks which agents use which skills and enables impact analysis for updates.","intents":["stay informed about security updates for MCP servers my agents depend on","identify unmaintained or abandoned skills that should be replaced","understand the impact of updating a skill across multiple agents","plan skill upgrades and deprecations systematically"],"best_for":["teams managing multiple agents with shared MCP server dependencies","organizations wanting to track skill health across their agent ecosystem","developers planning skill upgrades and deprecations"],"limitations":["health tracking requires continuous monitoring — adds operational overhead","update notifications may be noisy if not filtered appropriately","impact analysis is based on declared dependencies — may miss indirect impacts","requires integration with external data sources (GitHub, registries)"],"requires":["Node.js 18+","skills registry with dependency information","network access to GitHub and other registries","optional: notification system integration"],"input_types":["MCP server definitions","dependency version information","skills usage across agents"],"output_types":["health status for each skill","update notifications","impact analysis for skill updates","deprecation warnings"],"categories":["automation-workflow","data-processing-analysis"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"github_mcp-affaan-m-agentshield__cap_2","uri":"capability://safety.moderation.permissive.tool.permission.analysis.with.wildcard.and.deny.list.detection","name":"permissive tool permission analysis with wildcard and deny-list detection","description":"Analyzes agent tool permission definitions to identify overly broad access patterns, including wildcard permissions (e.g., Bash(*)), missing deny lists for destructive operations, and privilege escalation vectors. Uses pattern matching on tool definitions to flag configurations where an agent could execute arbitrary shell commands or access sensitive files without restrictions.","intents":["identify if my agent has wildcard bash access that could be exploited","ensure my agent cannot access sensitive file paths or execute destructive commands","audit tool permissions to enforce least-privilege principle","detect missing deny lists for operations like rm, dd, or network exfiltration"],"best_for":["teams deploying agents in production who need to minimize blast radius of compromise","security architects designing agent permission models","organizations with compliance requirements (SOC2, ISO27001) for access control"],"limitations":["cannot detect runtime permission escalation through tool chaining or indirect access","does not validate whether deny lists are actually enforced by the runtime","requires understanding of tool semantics — may miss domain-specific dangerous operations"],"requires":["Node.js 18+","agent configuration with explicit tool definitions","optional: MiniClaw runtime for enforcement of detected policies"],"input_types":["tool permission definitions in settings.json or mcp.json","tool whitelist/blacklist configurations"],"output_types":["Finding objects identifying wildcard patterns and missing deny lists","remediation suggestions with specific tool restrictions"],"categories":["safety-moderation","code-review-security"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"github_mcp-affaan-m-agentshield__cap_3","uri":"capability://safety.moderation.hook.injection.vulnerability.detection.with.command.and.exfiltration.pattern.analysis","name":"hook injection vulnerability detection with command and exfiltration pattern analysis","description":"Analyzes PreToolUse and SessionStart hooks for command injection vulnerabilities and data exfiltration patterns. Scans hook code for dangerous patterns (shell metacharacters, subprocess calls, network requests) and detects capability escalation attempts where hooks could bypass tool restrictions or leak system prompts. Uses AST-level or regex-based pattern matching to identify risky hook implementations.","intents":["detect if my PreToolUse hooks could be exploited for command injection","identify hooks that might exfiltrate system prompts or sensitive data","audit hook code for dangerous subprocess calls or network requests","ensure hooks enforce security policies rather than bypass them"],"best_for":["developers implementing custom hooks in Claude Code agents","security teams reviewing hook implementations for compliance","teams using hooks for tool filtering or policy enforcement"],"limitations":["pattern-based detection may miss sophisticated injection techniques or obfuscated code","cannot detect hooks that are dynamically generated or loaded at runtime","false positives on legitimate hook code that uses subprocess for valid purposes"],"requires":["Node.js 18+","hook definitions in agent configuration files","optional: deep scan mode (--deep flag) for more thorough analysis"],"input_types":["hook code embedded in settings.json or CLAUDE.md","JavaScript/TypeScript hook implementations"],"output_types":["Finding objects with injection pattern location and severity","remediation guidance for secure hook implementation"],"categories":["safety-moderation","code-review-security"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"github_mcp-affaan-m-agentshield__cap_4","uri":"capability://safety.moderation.mcp.supply.chain.risk.assessment.with.version.pinning.and.source.verification","name":"mcp supply chain risk assessment with version pinning and source verification","description":"Analyzes MCP server configurations to identify supply chain vulnerabilities including unpinned versions, npx auto-installs, and risky server sources. Cross-references servers against a threat intelligence database (CVE database) to flag known vulnerable versions. Detects dynamic server loading patterns that could allow injection of malicious servers and validates server source authenticity.","intents":["identify MCP servers in my configuration that have known CVEs or security issues","ensure all MCP server versions are pinned to prevent auto-update attacks","detect if my configuration uses npx to auto-install servers (supply chain risk)","audit third-party MCP servers for trustworthiness and maintenance status"],"best_for":["teams using community MCP servers who need to validate their security posture","organizations with supply chain security requirements","developers building agent ecosystems with multiple MCP server dependencies"],"limitations":["CVE database may lag behind actual vulnerability disclosures","cannot detect zero-day vulnerabilities in MCP servers","version pinning check does not validate whether pinned versions are actually secure","source verification relies on external threat intelligence — may have false positives"],"requires":["Node.js 18+","MCP server definitions in configuration files","network access to threat intelligence database (CVE, supply chain verification)","optional: --deep flag for full supply chain analysis"],"input_types":["MCP server configurations with name, version, and source","package.json or lock files for dependency pinning"],"output_types":["Finding objects with CVE references and severity","supply chain risk scores","remediation steps (pin versions, update to patched releases)"],"categories":["safety-moderation","data-processing-analysis"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"github_mcp-affaan-m-agentshield__cap_5","uri":"capability://safety.moderation.prompt.injection.and.capability.escalation.detection.with.multi.chain.analysis","name":"prompt injection and capability escalation detection with multi-chain analysis","description":"Detects prompt injection vulnerabilities and capability escalation attacks in agent prompts, including 'Russian Doll' multi-chain injection vectors where an attacker chains multiple prompts to bypass restrictions. Analyzes prompt definitions for patterns that could allow an attacker to override system instructions, escalate tool access, or manipulate agent behavior. Uses pattern matching and semantic analysis to identify risky prompt structures.","intents":["identify if my system prompt could be overridden through user input","detect capability escalation attempts in multi-turn conversations","audit prompts for 'Russian Doll' injection patterns that chain multiple exploits","ensure my agent prompts enforce security boundaries and cannot be manipulated"],"best_for":["teams building Claude Code agents with user-facing interfaces","security researchers testing agent robustness against prompt injection","organizations with strict prompt security requirements"],"limitations":["prompt injection detection is heuristic-based and may miss sophisticated attacks","cannot detect runtime prompt injection from external sources (user input, API responses)","false positives on legitimate prompts that discuss security or tool usage","deep scan mode (--opus flag) required for multi-chain analysis — adds latency"],"requires":["Node.js 18+","agent prompt definitions in CLAUDE.md or settings.json","optional: Claude 3.5 Opus API key for deep scan mode (--opus flag)","optional: --injection flag to enable adversarial prompt testing"],"input_types":["system prompts in CLAUDE.md","prompt templates in agent configuration","user-facing prompt instructions"],"output_types":["Finding objects with injection pattern and severity","remediation guidance for prompt hardening","adversarial prompt examples (in deep scan mode)"],"categories":["safety-moderation","planning-reasoning"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"github_mcp-affaan-m-agentshield__cap_6","uri":"capability://safety.moderation.deep.scan.adversarial.analysis.with.three.agent.opus.pipeline","name":"deep scan adversarial analysis with three-agent opus pipeline","description":"Activates an advanced security analysis mode using Claude 3.5 Opus in a three-agent pipeline (Attacker/Defender/Auditor) to simulate real-world exploits against agent configurations. The Attacker agent generates adversarial prompts and attack scenarios, the Defender agent proposes mitigations, and the Auditor agent validates findings. This goes beyond static rules to discover novel vulnerabilities through adversarial reasoning.","intents":["simulate real attacks against my agent configuration to find vulnerabilities static analysis misses","get expert security analysis of my agent setup from an LLM perspective","discover novel prompt injection techniques specific to my agent's design","validate that my security mitigations actually work against adversarial attacks"],"best_for":["security teams doing comprehensive agent security audits","developers building high-security agents (financial, healthcare, critical infrastructure)","researchers studying agent security and adversarial robustness"],"limitations":["requires Claude 3.5 Opus API access — adds significant cost and latency (minutes per scan)","Opus-based analysis is non-deterministic — results may vary between runs","cannot guarantee finding all vulnerabilities — adversarial analysis is heuristic-based","may generate false positives on legitimate agent behaviors"],"requires":["Node.js 18+","Claude 3.5 Opus API key with sufficient quota","network access to Anthropic API","--deep flag or specific flags (--opus, --injection, --taint-analysis, --sandbox)","agent configuration files"],"input_types":["complete agent configuration (settings.json, mcp.json, CLAUDE.md)","tool definitions and permissions","hook implementations"],"output_types":["adversarial attack scenarios and exploitation techniques","Finding objects with Opus-generated severity and remediation","detailed security report with attack chains and mitigations"],"categories":["safety-moderation","planning-reasoning"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"github_mcp-affaan-m-agentshield__cap_7","uri":"capability://safety.moderation.taint.analysis.for.data.flow.tracking.and.exfiltration.detection","name":"taint analysis for data flow tracking and exfiltration detection","description":"Performs data flow analysis to track how sensitive data (system prompts, API keys, user inputs) flows through agent configurations, hooks, and tool calls. Identifies potential exfiltration paths where sensitive data could leak to external systems (network requests, logs, tool outputs). Uses taint propagation to mark sensitive sources and detect when tainted data reaches dangerous sinks.","intents":["ensure my agent cannot exfiltrate system prompts through tool outputs or network requests","track how API keys and secrets flow through my agent configuration","identify if hooks could leak sensitive data to external systems","validate that user inputs cannot be used to extract sensitive information"],"best_for":["teams building agents that handle sensitive data (PII, financial info, secrets)","security teams validating data isolation in multi-tenant agent setups","developers implementing custom hooks and want to ensure data safety"],"limitations":["taint analysis is conservative — may flag legitimate data flows as risky","cannot track data flows through external systems or APIs","requires understanding of tool semantics to identify dangerous sinks","deep scan mode (--taint-analysis flag) required — adds latency"],"requires":["Node.js 18+","complete agent configuration with data flow paths","--deep flag or --taint-analysis flag","optional: Claude 3.5 Opus API key for advanced analysis"],"input_types":["agent configuration with tool definitions","hook implementations","data source definitions (user input, API responses)"],"output_types":["data flow diagrams showing taint propagation","Finding objects identifying exfiltration paths","remediation guidance for data isolation"],"categories":["safety-moderation","data-processing-analysis"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"github_mcp-affaan-m-agentshield__cap_8","uri":"capability://safety.moderation.injection.testing.with.adversarial.prompt.generation.and.execution.simulation","name":"injection testing with adversarial prompt generation and execution simulation","description":"Generates adversarial prompts designed to exploit detected vulnerabilities and simulates their execution against the agent configuration without actually running them. Tests injection vectors including prompt override, tool escalation, and data exfiltration. Uses Claude 3.5 Opus to generate realistic attack prompts and validates whether the agent's security controls would prevent exploitation.","intents":["test if my agent is actually vulnerable to the injection patterns AgentShield detected","generate realistic adversarial prompts that could exploit my agent","validate that my security mitigations actually prevent detected attacks","understand the practical impact of detected vulnerabilities"],"best_for":["security teams validating vulnerability severity before remediation","developers testing security fixes to ensure they work","researchers studying agent robustness and adversarial resilience"],"limitations":["execution simulation does not run actual agent code — may miss runtime-specific vulnerabilities","generated prompts are heuristic-based and may not represent real attacker techniques","requires Claude 3.5 Opus API — adds cost and latency","cannot test vulnerabilities that require external system interaction"],"requires":["Node.js 18+","Claude 3.5 Opus API key","complete agent configuration","--injection flag or --deep flag"],"input_types":["agent configuration with detected vulnerabilities","tool definitions and permissions","prompt definitions"],"output_types":["generated adversarial prompts","execution simulation results","vulnerability impact assessment"],"categories":["safety-moderation","planning-reasoning"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"github_mcp-affaan-m-agentshield__cap_9","uri":"capability://safety.moderation.sandbox.behavioral.analysis.with.runtime.execution.monitoring","name":"sandbox behavioral analysis with runtime execution monitoring","description":"Executes agent configurations in an isolated sandbox environment and monitors their runtime behavior for security violations. Tracks system calls, network requests, file access, and tool invocations to detect whether the agent violates its declared permissions or exhibits suspicious behavior. Compares actual behavior against the declared security policy to identify policy violations.","intents":["verify that my agent actually respects the tool permissions I declared","detect if my agent makes unexpected network requests or file accesses","monitor agent behavior for signs of compromise or malicious activity","validate that security controls are actually enforced at runtime"],"best_for":["teams deploying agents in production who need runtime security validation","security teams monitoring agent behavior for anomalies","developers testing that security fixes actually work in practice"],"limitations":["sandbox execution adds significant latency and resource overhead","may not detect sophisticated attacks that avoid triggering monitored behaviors","requires ability to execute agent code — not suitable for untrusted configurations","sandbox escape vulnerabilities could allow agent to bypass monitoring"],"requires":["Node.js 18+","ability to execute agent code in isolated environment","system call tracing tools (strace, dtrace, or equivalent)","--sandbox flag or --deep flag","sufficient system resources for sandbox execution"],"input_types":["executable agent configuration","tool implementations","hook code"],"output_types":["runtime behavior trace (system calls, network requests, file access)","policy violation findings","behavioral anomaly alerts"],"categories":["safety-moderation","automation-workflow"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0}],"trust":{"score":44,"verified":false,"data_access_risk":"high","permissions":["Node.js 18+","TypeScript runtime or compiled JavaScript","read access to agent configuration directories","read access to configuration files","optional: integration with secret scanning tools (git-secrets, TruffleHog)","MCP server definitions with source information","GitHub API token (optional, for higher rate limits)","network access to GitHub and other registries","--deep flag or --supply-chain flag","findings from scanning modules"],"failure_modes":["static analysis only — cannot detect runtime behavioral exploits or zero-day patterns not in rule registry","requires files to be discoverable on local filesystem — no remote scanning of cloud-hosted configs","rule false-positive rate documented in false-positive-audit.md; some rules may flag legitimate patterns","pattern-based detection may miss obfuscated or custom secret formats not in the rule set","cannot detect secrets already rotated or invalidated — only identifies presence","high false-positive rate on legitimate long alphanumeric strings; requires manual review","verification relies on external data sources (GitHub, registries) — may be incomplete or outdated","cannot detect compromised maintainer accounts or supply chain attacks after initial verification","reputation assessment is heuristic-based and may not reflect actual security posture","requires network access to GitHub API and other external services","builder identity is not verified yet","no observed match outcomes yet"],"rank_breakdown":{"adoption":0.39207059301702757,"quality":0.5,"ecosystem":0.6000000000000001,"match_graph":0.25,"freshness":0.75,"weights":{"adoption":0.25,"quality":0.25,"ecosystem":0.1,"match_graph":0.28,"freshness":0.12}},"observed_outcomes":{"matches":0,"success_rate":0,"avg_confidence":0,"top_intents":[],"last_matched_at":null},"maintenance":{"status":"active","updated_at":"2026-05-24T12:16:22.064Z","last_scraped_at":"2026-05-03T14:23:44.761Z","last_commit":"2026-04-17T05:30:38Z"},"community":{"stars":584,"forks":124,"weekly_downloads":null,"model_downloads":null,"model_likes":null}},"distribution":{"claim_url":"https://unfragile.ai/submit?claim=mcp-affaan-m-agentshield","compare_url":"https://unfragile.ai/compare?artifact=mcp-affaan-m-agentshield"}},"signature":"OpEO40S90/Jz2sqtGnN4gre8H4j7zsQU7SCMKm5l+yPYavWGgg1wNERKQNa+du1afP+HGgjk/CbZm6EtlLbPBA==","signedAt":"2026-06-22T14:41:29.247Z","signedBy":"unfragile.ai","version":1},"_links":{"self":"https://unfragile.ai/api/v1/passport/mcp-affaan-m-agentshield","artifact":"https://unfragile.ai/mcp-affaan-m-agentshield","verify":"https://unfragile.ai/api/v1/verify?slug=mcp-affaan-m-agentshield","publicKey":"https://unfragile.ai/api/v1/trust-passport-public-key","spec":"https://unfragile.ai/trust","schema":"https://unfragile.ai/schema.json","docs":"https://unfragile.ai/docs"}}