{"passport":{"unfragile":{"@version":"1.0","version":"2026-05","artifact":{"id":"smithery_alexhtruong-vault-mcp","slug":"alexhtruong-vault-mcp","name":"Vault MCP Server","type":"mcp","url":"https://smithery.ai/servers/alexhtruong/vault-mcp","page_url":"https://unfragile.ai/alexhtruong-vault-mcp","categories":["mcp-servers","rag-knowledge","code-review-security"],"tags":["mcp","model-context-protocol","smithery:alexhtruong/vault-mcp"],"pricing":{"model":"open_source","free":true,"starting_price":null},"status":"active","verified":false},"capabilities":[{"id":"smithery_alexhtruong-vault-mcp__cap_0","uri":"capability://tool.use.integration.mcp.compliant.encrypted.vault.access.protocol","name":"mcp-compliant encrypted vault access protocol","description":"Implements the Model Context Protocol (MCP) server specification to expose encrypted vault operations through a standardized bidirectional message interface. Uses MCP's JSON-RPC 2.0 transport layer to handle tool definitions, resource schemas, and prompt templates, enabling any MCP-compatible client (Claude, custom agents, IDE extensions) to invoke vault operations without custom integration code. The server registers itself as a resource provider within the MCP ecosystem, allowing clients to discover and call vault methods through standard MCP tool-calling conventions.","intents":["I want to expose my encrypted vault as a standardized service that any MCP client can consume without custom adapters","I need my LLM agent to securely access encrypted secrets through a protocol-agnostic interface","I want to integrate vault operations into Claude or other MCP-compatible tools without building custom connectors"],"best_for":["Teams building MCP-native applications and agents","Organizations standardizing on MCP for tool integration","Developers integrating encrypted storage into Claude or other MCP clients"],"limitations":["Requires MCP client support — not compatible with REST-only or gRPC-only applications","MCP transport overhead adds latency compared to direct library calls","Client must implement MCP protocol handling; no built-in fallback to simpler protocols"],"requires":["MCP client implementation (Claude, custom agent, or MCP-compatible IDE)","Node.js or Python runtime supporting MCP server libraries","Network connectivity between MCP client and server"],"input_types":["MCP tool invocation requests (JSON-RPC 2.0)","Resource URIs identifying vault paths","Structured parameters matching registered tool schemas"],"output_types":["MCP tool results (JSON-RPC 2.0 responses)","Encrypted data payloads","Metadata and status information"],"categories":["tool-use-integration","mcp-protocol"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"smithery_alexhtruong-vault-mcp__cap_1","uri":"capability://data.processing.analysis.encrypted.data.storage.and.retrieval.with.key.management","name":"encrypted data storage and retrieval with key management","description":"Provides core vault operations for storing and retrieving encrypted data with integrated key derivation and management. Implements encryption at rest using industry-standard algorithms (likely AES-256-GCM or similar) with support for key rotation, versioning, and secure key storage. The server handles encryption/decryption transparently, accepting plaintext input and returning encrypted payloads on write, and accepting encrypted data on read with automatic decryption using managed keys. Key material is never exposed to clients; all cryptographic operations occur server-side.","intents":["I need to store sensitive data (API keys, credentials, secrets) encrypted at rest with automatic key management","I want to retrieve previously encrypted secrets and have them automatically decrypted server-side","I need to rotate encryption keys without re-encrypting all stored data"],"best_for":["Applications requiring encrypted secret storage without managing keys themselves","Multi-tenant systems needing per-tenant or per-user encryption isolation","Teams implementing zero-trust architectures where encryption keys are never shared with clients"],"limitations":["Server-side decryption means the server must be trusted with plaintext data during operations","Key rotation may require background jobs to re-encrypt data; blocking operations during rotation","No client-side encryption option — all cryptographic material handled server-side only"],"requires":["Secure key storage backend (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS KMS, or local encrypted keystore)","Cryptographic library support (OpenSSL, libsodium, or equivalent)","Persistent storage for encrypted data (filesystem, database, or object storage)"],"input_types":["Plaintext secrets (strings, JSON objects, binary data)","Encryption metadata (key version, algorithm parameters)","Key identifiers for decryption routing"],"output_types":["Encrypted ciphertext with authentication tags","Decrypted plaintext (on retrieval)","Key metadata and rotation status"],"categories":["data-processing-analysis","safety-moderation"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"smithery_alexhtruong-vault-mcp__cap_2","uri":"capability://safety.moderation.vault.path.based.access.control.and.resource.discovery","name":"vault path-based access control and resource discovery","description":"Implements hierarchical path-based access control (PBAC) for vault resources, where permissions are granted at the path level (e.g., /secrets/prod/*, /secrets/dev/*). Clients discover available vault paths and their metadata through MCP resource endpoints, which return structured information about accessible vaults, their encryption status, and available operations. The server enforces access policies at request time, validating that the requesting client has permission to read, write, or delete at the requested path before executing operations.","intents":["I want to grant different clients access to different vault paths (e.g., staging team can only access /staging/*, production team can access /prod/*)","I need to discover what vault paths are available and their metadata without hardcoding paths in my application","I want to enforce fine-grained access control where some clients can read but not write certain paths"],"best_for":["Multi-tenant applications with per-tenant vault isolation","Teams implementing least-privilege access for secrets","Organizations with complex permission hierarchies across environments"],"limitations":["Path-based ACLs don't support attribute-based access control (ABAC) — no dynamic policy evaluation","No built-in audit logging of access attempts; requires external logging integration","Path discovery may expose sensitive information about vault structure to unauthorized clients"],"requires":["Access control policy configuration (file, database, or policy engine)","Client authentication mechanism (API keys, JWT tokens, mTLS certificates)","Path hierarchy definition in vault configuration"],"input_types":["Vault paths (strings in hierarchical format)","Client identity/credentials","Access control policy definitions"],"output_types":["List of accessible vault paths","Path metadata (encryption status, last modified, key version)","Access decision (allow/deny) with reason"],"categories":["safety-moderation","tool-use-integration"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"smithery_alexhtruong-vault-mcp__cap_3","uri":"capability://data.processing.analysis.vault.metadata.and.audit.trail.management","name":"vault metadata and audit trail management","description":"Tracks and exposes vault operation metadata including creation timestamps, modification history, key versions used for encryption, and operation audit trails. The server maintains metadata for each stored secret (e.g., when it was created, which key version encrypted it, who last modified it) and provides MCP tools to query this metadata without decrypting the underlying data. Audit trails record all vault operations (read, write, delete) with timestamps and client identifiers, enabling compliance and forensic analysis.","intents":["I need to know when a secret was last modified and by which client for compliance auditing","I want to track which encryption key version was used for each secret to manage key rotation","I need to query vault operation history to investigate unauthorized access or data changes"],"best_for":["Regulated industries requiring audit trails (finance, healthcare, government)","Teams implementing compliance frameworks (SOC 2, HIPAA, PCI-DSS)","Organizations needing forensic analysis of secret access patterns"],"limitations":["Audit trail storage can grow unbounded — requires retention policies and cleanup","Metadata queries may be slower than direct secret retrieval due to index overhead","No built-in redaction of sensitive information in audit logs — requires external log sanitization"],"requires":["Persistent audit log storage (database, log aggregation system, or filesystem)","Timestamp synchronization across distributed vault instances","Audit log retention policy configuration"],"input_types":["Query filters (date ranges, client IDs, operation types)","Metadata field selectors"],"output_types":["Audit log entries (JSON with timestamp, client, operation, path, result)","Metadata summaries (creation date, modification count, key version)","Statistics (operations per client, per path, per time period)"],"categories":["data-processing-analysis","safety-moderation"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"smithery_alexhtruong-vault-mcp__cap_4","uri":"capability://automation.workflow.multi.vault.instance.federation.and.replication","name":"multi-vault instance federation and replication","description":"Supports connecting multiple vault instances through MCP, enabling federation where a primary vault replicates encrypted data to secondary instances for high availability or geographic distribution. The server implements replication logic that synchronizes encrypted payloads and metadata across instances without exposing plaintext data. Clients can be configured to read from replicas for load balancing or failover, with the MCP protocol handling routing and consistency guarantees.","intents":["I want to replicate encrypted secrets across multiple geographic regions for disaster recovery","I need to distribute vault read load across multiple instances without exposing plaintext data","I want to ensure high availability where if one vault instance fails, clients can failover to a replica"],"best_for":["Distributed systems requiring multi-region secret storage","High-availability architectures with failover requirements","Organizations needing geographic data residency compliance"],"limitations":["Replication introduces eventual consistency — replicas may lag behind primary","Network partitions between vault instances can cause split-brain scenarios","Replication bandwidth scales with vault size; large vaults may have significant sync overhead"],"requires":["Network connectivity between primary and replica vault instances","Replication configuration (primary/replica designation, sync frequency)","Consistent clock synchronization across instances (NTP or similar)"],"input_types":["Replication topology configuration","Sync frequency and batch size parameters"],"output_types":["Replication status (in-sync, lagging, failed)","Sync lag metrics (bytes pending, last sync timestamp)","Replica health status"],"categories":["automation-workflow","tool-use-integration"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"smithery_alexhtruong-vault-mcp__cap_5","uri":"capability://data.processing.analysis.batch.vault.operations.with.transactional.semantics","name":"batch vault operations with transactional semantics","description":"Supports atomic batch operations where multiple vault reads/writes are executed together with all-or-nothing semantics. The server implements transaction-like behavior where if any operation in a batch fails, all changes are rolled back. This is implemented through a batch request format where clients submit multiple operations in a single MCP call, and the server processes them sequentially with rollback capability if any operation fails.","intents":["I need to update multiple related secrets atomically so they're always in a consistent state","I want to read multiple secrets in a single operation for efficiency","I need to ensure that if one secret update fails, all related updates are rolled back"],"best_for":["Applications with complex secret dependencies requiring atomic updates","High-throughput systems needing to batch multiple vault operations","Teams implementing distributed transactions across multiple services"],"limitations":["Batch operations block other clients from accessing affected paths during transaction","Rollback requires maintaining undo logs, adding memory overhead","No support for long-running transactions — timeouts will abort incomplete batches"],"requires":["Transaction log storage for rollback capability","Locking mechanism to prevent concurrent access during batch operations","Timeout configuration for batch operation limits"],"input_types":["Array of vault operations (read, write, delete)","Transaction timeout value"],"output_types":["Array of operation results (success/failure per operation)","Transaction ID for tracking","Rollback confirmation if transaction fails"],"categories":["data-processing-analysis","automation-workflow"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"smithery_alexhtruong-vault-mcp__cap_6","uri":"capability://automation.workflow.secret.rotation.and.versioning.with.zero.downtime.updates","name":"secret rotation and versioning with zero-downtime updates","description":"Provides automated secret rotation where new versions of secrets are created and old versions are gradually phased out without disrupting client access. The server maintains multiple versions of each secret and supports gradual migration where clients can be configured to prefer newer versions while still accepting older versions during transition periods. Rotation is coordinated through MCP operations that create new versions, update client routing policies, and eventually retire old versions.","intents":["I want to rotate API keys and credentials on a schedule without taking down dependent services","I need to migrate clients from old secret versions to new ones gradually to avoid disruption","I want to maintain multiple secret versions during rotation so clients have time to update"],"best_for":["Production systems requiring zero-downtime secret rotation","Organizations with strict credential rotation policies","Teams managing secrets across many dependent services"],"limitations":["Gradual migration increases complexity — requires tracking which clients use which versions","Old secret versions must be retained during transition, increasing storage","No automatic client notification when new versions are available — requires polling or webhooks"],"requires":["Version tracking and storage for multiple secret versions","Client routing configuration to control version preferences","Rotation schedule configuration"],"input_types":["Secret path to rotate","New secret value","Rotation policy (immediate vs gradual)"],"output_types":["New version ID","Migration status (percentage of clients on new version)","Deprecation timeline for old versions"],"categories":["automation-workflow","safety-moderation"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"smithery_alexhtruong-vault-mcp__cap_7","uri":"capability://safety.moderation.encryption.algorithm.and.key.strength.configuration","name":"encryption algorithm and key strength configuration","description":"Exposes configuration options for encryption algorithms, key lengths, and cryptographic parameters through MCP tools. Clients can query supported algorithms (AES-256-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305, etc.), key derivation functions (PBKDF2, Argon2, etc.), and configure per-vault or per-secret encryption parameters. The server validates that requested algorithms meet security requirements and prevents downgrade attacks by enforcing minimum key strengths.","intents":["I need to configure encryption to use FIPS-approved algorithms for compliance","I want to use different encryption algorithms for different sensitivity levels of secrets","I need to ensure all secrets meet minimum key strength requirements"],"best_for":["Regulated organizations with specific cryptographic requirements","Teams implementing defense-in-depth with algorithm diversity","Systems requiring FIPS 140-2 or similar compliance"],"limitations":["Changing algorithms for existing secrets requires re-encryption, which is expensive","Algorithm support depends on underlying cryptographic libraries — not all algorithms available on all platforms","Misconfiguration can weaken security — requires careful validation"],"requires":["Cryptographic library with support for multiple algorithms","Configuration validation to prevent weak algorithm selection","Documentation of supported algorithms and their security properties"],"input_types":["Algorithm name (string identifier)","Key length (bits)","Key derivation function parameters"],"output_types":["List of supported algorithms with security properties","Current encryption configuration","Validation results (algorithm meets requirements or not)"],"categories":["safety-moderation","data-processing-analysis"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0},{"id":"smithery_alexhtruong-vault-mcp__cap_8","uri":"capability://data.processing.analysis.vault.entry.metadata.and.tagging.system","name":"vault entry metadata and tagging system","description":"Stores and manages metadata (creation timestamp, last modified, owner, tags, TTL, rotation policy) alongside encrypted vault entries, enabling rich querying and lifecycle management. Implements tag-based filtering to allow clients to query vault entries by tags (e.g., 'production', 'api-keys', 'database-credentials') without decrypting data. Supports automatic expiration (TTL) and rotation policies that trigger re-encryption or deletion based on configured schedules.","intents":["I want to tag secrets by environment (prod/staging) and query all production secrets","I need to automatically rotate API keys after 90 days","I want to track who created each secret and when it was last modified"],"best_for":["Large-scale vault deployments with hundreds/thousands of entries","Systems requiring automated secret rotation and lifecycle management","Compliance-heavy environments requiring detailed audit trails"],"limitations":["Metadata storage adds overhead to vault operations","Tag-based queries require indexing — can be slow without proper database design","TTL and rotation policies require background job infrastructure"],"requires":["Metadata storage layer (database, indexed filesystem, or KV store)","Background job scheduler for TTL/rotation enforcement","Tag indexing infrastructure for efficient queries"],"input_types":["Metadata key-value pairs (tags, TTL, rotation policy)","Query filters (tag names, date ranges, owner)","Rotation policy definitions"],"output_types":["Vault entries with metadata","Query results (filtered by tags/metadata)","Rotation/expiration notifications"],"categories":["data-processing-analysis","memory-knowledge"],"confidence":0.5,"matches":0,"success_rate":0}],"trust":{"score":33,"verified":false,"data_access_risk":"high","permissions":["MCP client implementation (Claude, custom agent, or MCP-compatible IDE)","Node.js or Python runtime supporting MCP server libraries","Network connectivity between MCP client and server","Secure key storage backend (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS KMS, or local encrypted keystore)","Cryptographic library support (OpenSSL, libsodium, or equivalent)","Persistent storage for encrypted data (filesystem, database, or object storage)","Access control policy configuration (file, database, or policy engine)","Client authentication mechanism (API keys, JWT tokens, mTLS certificates)","Path hierarchy definition in vault configuration","Persistent audit log storage (database, log aggregation system, or filesystem)"],"failure_modes":["Requires MCP client support — not compatible with REST-only or gRPC-only applications","MCP transport overhead adds latency compared to direct library calls","Client must implement MCP protocol handling; no built-in fallback to simpler protocols","Server-side decryption means the server must be trusted with plaintext data during operations","Key rotation may require background jobs to re-encrypt data; blocking operations during rotation","No client-side encryption option — all cryptographic material handled server-side only","Path-based ACLs don't support attribute-based access control (ABAC) — no dynamic policy evaluation","No built-in audit logging of access attempts; requires external logging integration","Path discovery may expose sensitive information about vault structure to unauthorized clients","Audit trail storage can grow unbounded — requires retention policies and cleanup","builder identity is not verified yet","no observed match outcomes yet"],"rank_breakdown":{"adoption":0.05,"quality":0.43,"ecosystem":0.5900000000000001,"match_graph":0.25,"freshness":0.5,"weights":{"adoption":0.25,"quality":0.25,"ecosystem":0.15,"match_graph":0.23,"freshness":0.12}},"observed_outcomes":{"matches":0,"success_rate":0,"avg_confidence":0,"top_intents":[],"last_matched_at":null},"maintenance":{"status":"active","updated_at":"2026-05-24T12:16:25.635Z","last_scraped_at":"2026-05-03T15:19:48.006Z","last_commit":null},"community":{"stars":null,"forks":null,"weekly_downloads":null,"model_downloads":null,"model_likes":null}},"distribution":{"claim_url":"https://unfragile.ai/submit?claim=alexhtruong-vault-mcp","compare_url":"https://unfragile.ai/compare?artifact=alexhtruong-vault-mcp"}},"signature":"UNdDVJ97KdLlhp6yFlPeHUzovbv5VAT4VNkjYeOyGhHPUvYl2Jcsz20ncpOVOR1lJVFWSi1XVxUt8031Cz8aCg==","signedAt":"2026-06-22T11:24:02.805Z","signedBy":"unfragile.ai","version":1},"_links":{"self":"https://unfragile.ai/api/v1/passport/alexhtruong-vault-mcp","artifact":"https://unfragile.ai/alexhtruong-vault-mcp","verify":"https://unfragile.ai/api/v1/verify?slug=alexhtruong-vault-mcp","publicKey":"https://unfragile.ai/api/v1/trust-passport-public-key","spec":"https://unfragile.ai/trust","schema":"https://unfragile.ai/schema.json","docs":"https://unfragile.ai/docs"}}